Prioritizing efforts to improve foreign public opinion of America applying a business model to discover and create customer value by Sampson, Anthony J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2007-12
Prioritizing efforts to improve foreign public opinion
of America applying a business model to discover
and create customer value
Sampson, Anthony J.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3135










Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
PRIORITIZING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE FOREIGN PUBLIC 
OPINION OF AMERICA: APPLYING A BUSINESS MODEL TO 








 Thesis Advisor:  Erik Jansen 
 Second Reader: Bryan Hudgens 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per 
response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering 
and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, 
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate 
for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2007 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Prioritizing Efforts to Improve 
Foreign Public Opinion of America: Applying a Business 
Model to Discover and Create Customer Value 
6. AUTHOR(S) Anthony J. Sampson 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER   




  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and 
do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. 
Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is 
unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The U.S. National Security Strategy contains objectives that involve winning the 
battle for the hearts and minds of the foreign public. A study of literature and 
polling data reveals worldwide resentment toward America, indicating that America may 
be losing this battle. Given the reality of fiscal and resource constraints, America 
could not possibly address all of the concerns of the foreign public; rather, America 
must focus its efforts on the factors that are likely to make the greatest impact. This 
study identifies negative factors that interfere with favorable foreign pubic opinion 
and suggests an analytic framework for prioritizing those factors. Based on the 
theoretical output, America’s top priorities should consist of minimizing the visible 
presences of U.S. troops in Arab nations; increasing understanding and consideration of 
how U.S. activities are perceived to impact Arab-Islamic culture; and readdressing 
recent unilateralist policy decisions that create a wedge between America and its 
European allies. Further in-depth research is required in order to establish more 
operationally realistic and actionable output, which takes into account the variables 
that this study excludes. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
119 
14. SUBJECT TERMS: Resource Allocation, Prioritizing, Foreign Public 
Opinion, Public Diplomacy, Business Models, Customer Value, 
Attribute Mapping, Anti-Americanism, Hearts and Minds 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
PRIORITIZING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE FOREIGN PUBLIC OPINION OF 
AMERICA: APPLYING A BUSINESS MODEL TO DISCOVER AND CREATE 
CUSTOMER VALUE 
 
Anthony J. Sampson 
Captain, United States Air Force 
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 2000 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Gordon McCormick, Ph.D. 
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The U.S. National Security Strategy contains 
objectives that involve winning the battle for the hearts 
and minds of the foreign public. A study of literature and 
polling data reveals worldwide resentment toward America, 
indicating that America may be losing this battle. Given 
the reality of fiscal and resource constraints, America 
could not possibly address all of the concerns of the 
foreign public; rather, America must focus its efforts on 
the factors that are likely to make the greatest impact. 
This study identifies negative factors that interfere with 
favorable foreign pubic opinion and suggests an analytic 
framework for prioritizing those factors. Based on the 
theoretical output, America’s top priorities should consist 
of minimizing the visible presences of U.S. troops in Arab 
nations; increasing understanding and consideration of how 
U.S. activities are perceived to impact Arab-Islamic 
culture; and readdressing recent unilateralist policy 
decisions that create a wedge between America and its 
European allies. Further in-depth research is required in 
order to establish more operationally realistic and 
actionable output, which takes into account the variables 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Strengthening our public diplomacy, so that we 
advocate the policies and values of the United 
States in a clear, accurate, and persuasive way 
to a watching and listening world. This includes 
actively engaging foreign audiences, expanding 
educational opportunities for Americans to learn 
about foreign languages and cultures and for 
foreign students and scholars to study in the 
United States; empowering the voices of our 
citizen ambassadors as well as those foreigners 
who share our commitment to a safer, more 
compassionate world; enlisting the support of the 
private sector; increasing our channels for 
dialogue with Muslim leaders and citizens; and 
confronting propaganda quickly, before myths and 
distortions have time to take root in the hearts 
and minds of people across the world. (President 
Bush, 2006, p. 50) 
These words, expressed in one of the most recent 
United States National Security Strategy (NSS) objectives 
speak to America’s recognition of the importance of 
international relations and the battle for the hearts and 
minds of the foreign public. This common theme emerges, as 
throughout the NSS verbiage repeatedly reiterates how the 
United States must “[work] with existing international 
institutions” (p. 11), “strengthen alliances to defeat 
global terrorism (p. 13),” “work with others to defuse 
regional conflicts” (p. 19) and “develop agendas for 
cooperative action” (p. 40). America not only acknowledges 
the significance of strengthening public diplomacy in 
conflict areas in the Middle East, but also with 
traditional U.S. allies that share many Western values. 
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Europe is home to some of our oldest and closest 
allies. Our cooperative relations are built on a 
sure foundation of shared values and interests. 
This foundation is expanding and deepening with 
the ongoing spread of effective democracies in 
Europe, and must expand and deepen still further 
if we are to reach the goal of a Europe whole, 
free, and at peace. (President Bush, 2006, p. 43)  
Though the NSS contains a well articulated and 
comprehensive list of objectives for international 
relations, it does not set a stage for how the United 
States will prioritize its objectives. Recent studies 
(e.g., Pew Research Center, 2007; Arab American Institute, 
2006) indicate that America may be losing that battle for 
hearts and minds, which may hinder U.S. efforts to counter 
terrorist propaganda and ideology, promote democracy, and 
increase worldwide collaboration. As such, one could argue 
that all diplomatic efforts are of equal strategic 
importance. However, given the reality of fiscal and 
resource constraints, America must identify the factors 
that are of greatest “value and interest” to the foreign 
public. To counteract negative public opinion, the United 
States must prioritize and focus its resources on issues 
that have the greatest probability of impacting America’s 
ability to influence foreign public opinion in favor of 
American interests. This study attempts to first identify 
those negative factors that interfere with favorable 
foreign pubic opinion and, secondly, suggests an analytic 
framework for prioritizing these factors. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of my research is two-fold. First, the 
purpose is to identify the various factors that contribute 
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to the foreign public’s generally negative opinion of 
America. This phase of the study is accomplished through a 
macro-level review of literature. In the book, Why Do 
People Hate America?, the authors alert their readers that 
"This is… not a book about the positive sides of the United 
States" (2003, p. 6). Similarly, this study does not focus 
on the many positive attributes of this great nation; 
rather, it focuses almost solely on illuminating the U.S. 
attributes that the foreign public perceives negatively, 
which the framework outlined in the second phase of this 
study suggests is of greatest importance. Though some 
negative opinions could be grounded in immature jealousy, 
envy or ignorance, and presents a legitimate opportunity 
for rebuttal against those opinions or a defense of 
America’s stance, the scope of this study leaves that 
effort to further research. 
The purpose of the second phase of this research is to 
present a framework to analyze the factors identified in 
the first phase. This provides an attempt to suggest how 
the United States could prioritize its effort to change 
foreign public opinion in order to further U.S. interests 
at home and abroad. This study does not attempt to say 
‘how’ America should go about addressing foreign public 
opinions, nor whether there are ‘greater interests’ than 
addressing them, but is limited to a demonstration of 
another way of framing the issue. As such, this study also 
seeks to motivate further research to establish more 
operationally realistic and actionable outputs, which take 
into account the variables excluded by this study. There is 
still great value in this study, which lies in identifying 
and prioritizing negative opinions; it contributes to 
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understanding what issues make the biggest impact on 
foreign hearts and minds. Whether the United States chooses 
to address each issue by changing policy, by more 
effectively promoting U.S. interests, by refuting 
propaganda, by ignoring it, or by any other means, is 
outside of the scope of this study. 
C. SUMMARY 
This introduction has highlighted the need to conduct 
a macro-level review of the relevant factors contributing 
to unfavorable foreign public opinion of America, as well 
as the need for analytic methods to determine resource 
allocation priorities for the identified factors. Chapter 
II identifies some of the most prominently cited negative 
factors. Chapter III then suggests the analytic framework 
for identifying how to prioritize these factors. Chapter IV 
presents the results generated by using the analytic 
framework. Finally, Chapter V concludes the study with 
recommended readings and recommendations for further 
research. 
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II. CRITICAL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U.S.: A SUMMARY 
OF THE FACTORS THAT CAUSE ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
When you pose a question about two disparate cultures 
and their intertwined relationship, common sense leads 
you to involve both parties. Yet, for the past six 
years, I have watched the D.C. circles fail to do just 
that. Each anniversary, I witness Americans asking 
Americans, discussing among other Americans, the topic 
of something none of them are – Arabs. Six years after 
the devastating attacks, Americans are still asking 
that ubiquitous question: ‘Why do they hate us?’….Yet, 
if Americans insist on posing this question, I pose 
another. ‘Why don’t ‘you’ ask them?’ (Elmenshawy, 
2007) 
Resentment, distain and outright hatred for America 
come in many forms and from many places all around the 
world (Pew Research Center, December 2003). This hatred is 
not confined to the Arab public, as some may think. People 
can be found in Africa, in Latin America, and even in 
allied nations in Asia and Europe that harbor deep seeded 
resentment for America. For the purposes of this study, the 
primary focus will be on the sources of resentment from our 
allies in Western Europe, and Arab nations in the Middle 
East. The purpose of this chapter is not to discuss the 
positive U.S. attributes, but to reveal the U.S. attributes 
that are often perceived negatively. This information will 
provide valuable input for the framework outlined in 
Chapter III of this study, which suggests that negative 
attributes have the greatest potential for major impact on 
public opinion. The results of this study suggest ‘what’ 
American should prioritize, but will not address ‘how’ 
America should respond. 
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People dislike America for numerous different reasons. 
Some may be well founded and there may or may not be 
anything that American can do about it. Other reasons may 
be trivial, juvenile, or a natural and unavoidable 
consequence of American power and influence. This study 
does not debate the validity of these reasons nor 
distinguish between those reasons that are within or 
outside of American control; rather, this study provides a 
list of predominant reasons for resentment, based on 
literature research in conjunction with poll results. The 
first section, B through E of this chapter, will present 
the overall research findings in a narrative form to 
provide some explanation for the reasons for resentment, 
and to give the issues a voice. The second section, F of 
this chapter, presents the polling data which also reveals 
reasons for and prominence of resentment. The reasons in 
the first section are broken into three categories: 1) what 
America says, or U.S. policy; 2) what America does, or U.S. 
actions; and 3) who America is, or U.S. identity. The 
second section is broken down into time periods. 
Three things are worth noting before presenting this 
research. First, it should be noted that in order to 
develop a comprehensive list of reasons for anti-
Americanism, the survey of literature was not limited to 
scholarly works. Although scholarly works are used to 
validate the background and prevalence of foreign public 
opinion, as the quote above from Mohamed Elmenshawy 
suggests, it would be remiss to rely solely on them and 
ignore the massive realm of input from the general foreign 
public themselves. As such, I have cited input from 
published op-ed articles, unpublished writings on the 
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internet, and from internet blogs on the topic. Including 
these sources introduces biases into the study, but given 
that the nature of the study is opinion-oriented, this 
method is useful. Secondly, given the enormity of the input 
on this topic, it would be impossible to list every reason 
that people claim to resent America. Lastly, although the 
reasons that people resent America are separated into three 
categories in order to provide the reader of this study 
with an organized structure for framing the ideas, there is 
often no solid line of distinction between the reasons. In 
reality, one will find that the lines are blurred, as there 
is great correlation between what America says, what 
America does, and who America is perceived to be. 
B. WHAT AMERICA SAYS: OUR INTEREST ARE ALL THAT MATTER 
A constant source of criticism from the foreign public 
stems from what America says to the world. What America 
says to the world is defined by U.S. foreign policies, 
which are perceived as unilaterally-oriented. Specifically, 
U.S. foreign policy is perceived as being overwhelming 
selfish, and full of unilateralist stances that undermine 
collaborative efforts on a number of issues that concern 
the international community as a whole. Some of the 
policies that were most prominently cited as sources of 
resented were America’s policy on biological weapons, 
landmines, the environment, the United Nations (UN) and the 
Middle East. 
1. Biological Weapons 
One example of unilateralist policy that often is 
cited in literature took place in 2001 when President Bush 
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refused to sign an agreement that would allow all countries 
to be susceptible to biological weapons inspections (BBC 
News, July 2001). The refusal came as a shock and insult to 
many of the other 142 signatories. It dealt a major blow to 
long-standing negotiations to enforce the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention that bans germ warfare agents, and was 
“a major setback for international efforts to agree 
practical curbs on the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction” (Leader, 2001). True or not, U.S. actions gave 
much of the foreign public the impression that America had, 
or was interested in having the very weapons that it 
demanded that developing nations never get. To some, this 
action was yet another demonstration of American hypocrisy, 
“reckless, unilateralist behavior,” as well as total 
disregard for the UN, global consensus, and the opinion of 
the international community (Leader, 2001). 
Should U.S. national security interests and its 
biotechnology commercial interests take precedence over 
responsible global collaboration? Some think that it should 
not. If the United States plans to oppose an international 
agreement that is favored by the majority, should it not 
have some responsibility for presenting a proposal to 
replace it? Many think so, and resent that America does not 
(Kirby, 2001). Though the United States gives an argument 
as to why it refused to cooperate, mainly that the treaty 
was not strong enough and could hurt U.S. industry, U.S. 
unilateralism is enough to cause fear and resentment from 
some in the international community. 
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2. The Land Mine Treaty 
There was an empty chair at the Geneva meeting 
this past week on implementation of the 1997 Mine 
Ban Treaty. The 138 signers of the Treaty were 
reviewing progress made in removing mines, 
treating victims, and destroying stockpiles of a 
weapon that maims or murders 22,000 people a 
year… The refusal of America to sign the Mine Ban 
Treaty represents a particularly embarrassing 
contradiction, since President Clinton, during a 
1994 speech to the UN General Assembly, became 
the first leader of a major power to demand 
elimination of all antipersonnel land mines. 
(Boston Globe, 2000) 
Antipersonnel landmines kill and injure more innocent 
civilians than combatants, and the United States declared 
its commitment to help rid the world of them. In 1996, 
President Clinton promised that the United States would 
spearhead the international effort to rid the world of 
antipersonnel landmines, but America repeatedly broke this 
promise when it came to its own interest in Korea (Human 
Rights Watch, 2004). A U.S. proposal to keep over a million 
land mines on the demilitarized zone between North and 
South Korea has been rejected by the international 
community, including most of America's allies (Cloud, 
2004). Despite the fact that President Clinton eventually 
established a compromise in 1997, committing the United 
States to signing the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006 to eliminate 
all U.S. antipersonnel landmines, President Bush “retreated 
from a Clinton-era promise” (Cloud, 2004). Many believe 
that America’s empty chair at the Geneva meeting 
demonstrated contempt for the will of the international 
community and is seen as a “symbolic invitation” to 
governments that had not signed the treaty to follow suit, 
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mainly China, Russia, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and India 
(Boston Globe, 2000). As is the case with the biological 
weapons treaty debate, regardless of the reasons that 
America gives for rejecting international consensus, much 
of the foreign public view the American unilateralist 
stance as irresponsible, hypocritical and selfish. 
3. Kyoto Pact on Environmental Pollution 
The US contains 4% of the world's population but 
produces about 25% of all carbon dioxide 
emissions. By comparison, Britain emits 3% - 
about the same as India which has 15 times as 
many people. (BBC News, February 2002) 
As the world’s predominant polluter, America is 
resented by some because of its rejection of international 
efforts to curb the contribution of manmade toxins in the 
environment (BBC News, February 2002). Again, American 
actions are viewed as being in total self-interest, without 
regard for the opinions or wellbeing of the international 
community. Since the 1970s, America was at the forefront of 
efforts to protect the world from serious long-term 
environmental issues (Grumet, 2005), protection of 
endangered species (Annett, 1998), the ozone layer (Kamm, 
1987), and global warming (Olson, 1997); but in recent 
years, long-term worldwide issues have taken a back seat to 
U.S. financial interests. 
For example, in 2001 President Bush abandoned the 
international Kyoto Protocol, which was hailed as a 
“historic agreement” and signed by President Clinton in 
1998, arguing that it threatened U.S. economic interests 
(Clinton, 1997). The Kyoto Protocol would result in reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions by 8 percent of the 1990 levels 
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before 2012 (BBC News, June 2002). President Bush’s 
decision ignited widespread international criticism. 
Critics say that though the agreement was not perfect, 
nearly every industrial nation, including 15 European Union 
states, thought it was a large step in the right direction 
(BBC News, February 2002). The Kyoto Protocol became 
international law in 2004 when Russia signed on, which the 
foreign public hopes will put pressure on America to pull 
its weight (BBC News, 2004). According to the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, “The United States is expected 
to remain the largest source of petroleum-related carbon 
dioxide emissions… with projected emissions of 3.3 billion 
metric tons in 2030—still 66 percent above the 
corresponding projection for China” (Energy Information 
Administration, 2007). 
4. Abuse of the UN 
When it suits the US, it uses the UN to seek 
legitimacy for its actions, to build coalition 
and impose sanctions on 'rogue states'. When 
world opinion goes against the US, it treats the 
UN with utter contempt… Throughout the history of 
the UN, America has consistently vetoed any 
resolution or declaration that did not reflect US 
priorities or business interests. (Sardar and 
Davies, 2003, p. 69) 
Foreign governments, and hence some of the foreign 
public, take issue with the perceived American abuse and 
manipulation of the UN. America is often the sole 
opposition to a UN General Assembly consensus. The General 
Assembly has voted on resolutions that are meant to further 
human rights, peace, nuclear disarmament, economic justice, 
efforts to fight apartheid and efforts to end lawlessness. 
Over the three year period between 1984 and 1987, U.S. 
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discord in the UN was so potent that there were nearly 150 
occurrences where the United States cast the sole 'no' vote 
against a UN resolution (Sardar and Davies, 2003, p. 69). 
America’s perceived abuse of the veto system, 
especially on any issue involving Israel, is perceived as 
undermining to the function and effectiveness of the UN 
Security Council. Any pact that condemns illegal and 
aggressive activities of Israel has been a nearly automatic 
veto by the United States (Information Clearing House, 
2003). This seemingly unconditional American support of 
Israel is not only a source of hatred from the Middle East, 
but a source of great resentment worldwide when it results 
in America being the sole holdout on a unanimous 
condemnation of Israeli action. 
In addition to contrary behavior, the United States 
did not pay its UN dues for decades. In 1985, when the UN 
proposed that the U.S. proportion of assessed dues be 
reduced with an overall cap on the maximum amount that any 
state can contribute, the Regan administration disagreed 
with this proposal and promised to pay its back-dues 
(Commission on Global Governance, 1995, p. 300). Many 
suspect that the U.S. rejected the proposal because it 
would lose influence and bribing power over the UN. Despite 
the rejection of the proposal, and promise to pay, 
according to Sardar and Davies, the United States still 
“refused to fulfill the promise” and “the resentment 
against the US at typical UN meetings is so intense that it 
can be felt in the air” (p. 69). The resentment has lead to 
the U.S. being expelled from UN sub-groups. In 1998, the 
United States was expelled from the UN Advisory Committee 
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that dealt with UN funding as a whole. The United States 
was also kicked out of the Human Rights Commission in 2001, 
a result of many votes from European and other ‘friendly 
nations.’ 
5. Unfair Middle East Policy 
There are volumes of literature on the issue of 
resentment from the international community based on 
Israeli-U.S. relations (e.g., Karkar, 2007; Pfaff, 2006). 
In summary, many in the foreign public have negative 
opinions of the United States based on its perceived 
unfair, imbalanced, and categorical support for Israel, at 
the expense of Palestinians. This support is a source of 
resentment for states in the Middle East who feel that 
Israel has long occupied territory that is not their own, 
and has been on the offensive against the Arab world for 
decades (Karkar, 2007). From their point of view, Arab 
nations see that America not only supports Israel’s attacks 
and killings of innocent Muslims, but also arms Israel to 
do so. 
Outside of the Middle East, most nations recognize the 
great influence that the Israeli lobbies, like the 
‘American Israel Public Affairs Committee,’ have on 
American foreign policy (Judt, 2006). Americans seem to be 
convinced that Israeli and American national interests are 
inseparable. Some foreigners view America as Israeli 
puppets, thinking, “The influence of Israel on American 
policy has distorted it to Israel’s advantage, and 
sometimes to American disadvantage” (Pfaff, 2006). One 
piece of evidence for this, as previously mentioned, is the 
resentment that stems from America’s long record of vetoes 
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of any pact in the UN that paints Israeli actions in a 
negative light. Arabs perceive that America discriminates 
by condemning Arab attacks on Israelis, but never 
condemning attacks by Israelis on Arabs (USIslam.org, 
2007). According to some, the U.S. government has also 
exercised “informal censorship and even suppression or 
punishment for critical discussion on the Israeli-U.S. 
relationship (Pfaff, 2006). 
C. WHAT AMERICA DOES: SELFISH, OPPRESSIVE & SHORTSIGHTED 
AGGRESSION 
The second category of reasons for resentment, and 
often-outright hatred for America, stems from what America 
does around the world. What America does around the world 
is defined by U.S. economic and military actions, which are 
perceived as imperialistic. U.S. actions are perceived to 
be not only selfish, but also overly aggressive, and the 
source of long-term second and third order affects that 
cause suffering. U.S. actions are also perceived as a 
danger to the world, as evident by U.S. being rated by most 
of the foreign public, including U.S. allies, as one of the 
“greatest threats to world peace” (e.g., CNN, 2003; Pew 
Research Center, December 2003). Some of the actions that 
were cited were America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
(Gerges, 2005), history of Bombing and intervention (Global 
Policy Forum, 2005), political and economic oppression 
(Chernus, 2007), and arms trading (Blewett, 2000). 
1. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
A strategy of institutional partnership with 
Muslim civil society requires more than 
redressing foreign policy… Instead of expanding 
the “war on terror” and embarking on new military 
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ventures, American policy makers would be better 
served to exert systematic pressure on their Arab 
and Muslim ruling allies… (Gerges, 2005, pp. 275-
276) 
American military intervention in the Middle East, 
particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, is viewed as an 
occupation and a sign of American imperialism. Arab nations 
want America’s help with socioeconomic grievances, but do 
not all desire American boots on the ground in their land. 
One could understand this notion; most Americans may want 
British help in defending the U.S. against terror, but most 
likely do not want British soldiers on their streets. If 
such a scenario were to occur, could we not find Americans 
who otherwise would have no problems with British people 
increasingly resenting the British? Similarly, the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have played a major role in increasing 
Arab resentment toward America. 
Leaders of the jihadist movement like Al-Qaeda, 
Zawahiri and bin Laden found a renewed pool of recruits 
since the Iraq invasion in 2003; this after a period in 
which internal strife in the Arab community over some of 
the terrorist methods had reduced the flow of jihad 
recruits (Gerges, 2005, p. 265). Even America’s often 
criticized advocates in the Middle East, pro-Western 
liberal Arabs, began to publicly denounce U.S. action as 
“imperial hegemony” (p. 271).  
There is evidence that the renewed resentment toward 
America over the invasions in the Middle East may have been 
exactly what jihadist leaders planned. An al-Qaeda handbook 
authored by Abu Bakr Naji, translated from al Qaeda 
websites, suggested that the only reason the jihad movement 
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failed in the past was that the world superpowers fostered 
proxy governments in the Middle East and convinced the 
masses that they were invincible. The solution, Naji said 
was to “provoke a superpower into invading the Middle East 
directly” (Brachman and McCants, 2006). The expectation was 
that this would not necessarily create a military victory 
for the jihad, but would ultimately result in a “great 
propaganda victory.” 
…[Arab] people will 1) be impressed that the 
jihadis are directly fighting a superpower, 2) be 
outraged over the invasion of a foreign power, 3) 
be disabused of the notion that the superpower is 
invincible the longer the war goes on, and, 4) be 
angry at the proxy governments allied with the 
invading superpower. Moreover, he argues, it will 
bleed the superpower’s economy and military. This 
will lead to social unrest at home and the 
ultimate defeat of the superpower. (Brachman and 
McCants, 2006, p. 310)  
Thus far, it appears that Naji was correct. Polling 
data, discussed in section F of this chapter, indicates a 
continuous increase in negative Arab public opinion of 
America since the beginning of its war on terror in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
2. History of Bombing/Intervention: Hasty and 
Disproportionate 
Unconstrained by any superpower rival or system 
of global governance, the US giant has rewritten 
the global financial and trading system in its 
own interest; ripped up a string of treaties it 
finds inconvenient; sent troops to every corner 
of the globe; bombed Afghanistan, Sudan, 
Yugoslavia and Iraq without troubling the United 
Nations; maintained a string of murderous 
embargos against recalcitrant regimes; and 
recklessly thrown its weight behind Israel's 34- 
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year illegal military occupation of the West Bank 
and Gaza as the Palestinian intifada rages. 
(Milne, 2001) 
Portions of the foreign public see the American 
military as a self-identified big brother that has 
intervened in the developing world’s affairs for decades. 
From their point of view, America has been involved in, 
supplied weapons for, and secured oil or profited from many 
conflicts around the world in which many innocent people 
have died. America is perceived as always attempting to 
impose its will on other nations through military and 
economic power, or by instigation through its influence. 
Whether the reason is to spread democracy, or to secure 
oil, it is perceived as being for self-interest. Many feel 
that America has historically attempted to overthrow or 
undermine any government, through overt or covert measures, 
that was not a democracy or not moving in the direction of 
being a democracy. 
Of the many examples that some foreigners point to as 
evidence of America’s selfish, hasty or disproportionate 
aggression, one is the U.S. bombing of a Sudanese 
pharmaceutical factory in response to bombings of the U.S. 
embassy in Sudan (Barletta, 1998). Although the Clinton 
administration stated that the factory was linked to Osama 
bin Laden and involved in the production of chemical 
weapons, reportedly, this justification turned out to be 
fabricated and unreliable according to the Central 
Intelligence Agency (The New York Times, 1998). Similarly, 
the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 under the 
justification that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), only to have that justification 
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fall apart. As a result, innocent people have been killed, 
and much of the foreign public views this type of U.S. 
aggression as a growing trend, and a source of resentment 
toward America (CNN, 2004). 
Another example of perceived American disproportioned 
aggression is in U.S. attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
America remains the first and only nation to use nuclear 
bombs against the population of another nation, killing 
hundreds of thousands of civilians. Although the voice from 
Japan is largely considered one for peace and forgiveness, 
many will point to these attacks as a source of resentment 
(Kagan, 2006). Some of the foreign public believe that 
America must pay for its indiscriminate mass killing of so 
many people. 
3. Political and Economic Oppression 
Some of the foreign public resent the United States 
for what they perceive as oppression or repressive actions. 
Examples that are cited are U.S. support to authoritarian 
regimes, and U.S. oil and economic blockades. 
a. Support to Authoritarian Regimes: Hypocrisy 
 The U.S. has been accused of supporting 
authoritarian regimes in order to “protect U.S. interests” 
(Chernus, 2007). Many consider this repeated behavior a 
contribution to the oppression of their people, and an act 
of “hypocrisy” given the America’s long-claimed commitment 




It is the policy of the United States to seek and 
support the growth of democratic movements and 
institutions in every nation and culture, with 
the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our 
world…. All who live in tyranny and hopelessness 
can know: the United States will not ignore your 
oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When it 
stands for liberty, we will stand for you. 
(President Bush, 2005) 
 “Nice words” says Ira Chernus, professor of 
religious studies at the University of Colorado, but go 
tell it to “the Pakistanis….the Egyptians, or the Uzbeks, 
or the Palestinians, or the Nigerians, or the Saudis, or 
the inhabitants of all the countries where the 
administration has betrayed its promise to promote 
democracy” (Chernus, 2007). Just as America was accused of 
supporting oppressive groups like the Taliban in exchange 
for its help in fighting America’s enemy during the Cold 
war, America is accused of supporting dictators that will 
help to fight America’s present day enemy. “Now ‘terrorist’ 
have replaced ‘communists’,” Chernus says.  
 American support for the governments of Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt, both viewed by many Arabs as regimes that 
are “repressive, corrupt, and wholly dependent on American 
backing,” has been cited as one reason why Arabs are drawn 
to Osama bin Laden (Englund, 2001). President Bush is more 
recently criticized for his pledged support to Pakistani 
dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, named a indispensable 
U.S. ally in the war on terror (Chernus, 2007). Moreover, 
this news came at a time when many Pakistanis were still 
angry about the decline of its society into a feminist, gun 
and heroin infested land, which they attribute to President 
Regan’s decision to give billions of dollars in aid and 
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weapons to Pakistan’s dictator in the 1980s, General 
Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. America’s support allowed General Zia 
to arm the mujaheddin, Afghan guerillas, and warlords in 
order to resist Soviet occupation (Hamid, 2007).  
 These are a few of numerous examples that the 
foreign public cite as evidence of American hypocrisy 
through support for undemocratic entities. American 
interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iran and Iraq over the 
past several decades are all noted in literature as a 
source for lingering sour feelings amongst the foreign 
public, toward the United States. American’s common 
justification of “national security,” is viewed by some as 
the U.S. government’s “favorite catch-all code-word for 
interest of the American empire” (Chernus, 2007). 
b.  Oil and Economic Blockades 
 Another common source of resentment toward 
America stems from America’s economic activities, or 
activities that are perceived to be for economic gain. 
There is usually a suspicion that U.S. activities around 
the world are somehow tied to U.S. oil interests. America’s 
Cold War to keep communism away from the Persian Gulf 
(Hamid, 2007); U.S. suppression of national liberation 
movements in the Middle East (Kagan, 2006); and U.S. Iraq 
policies like the Oil-for-food resolution following the 
first Gulf War (Lynch, 2005, p. 103) are all attributed to 
U.S. oil interest, along with many other U.S. decisions. 
American dependency on oil for “national security 
interests” has created an air of constant doubt in the 
minds of the foreign public as to the sincerity of U.S. 
foreign policy motives. 
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 There is also worldwide resentment and concern, 
that U.S. policies cause “poverty and suffering” around the 
world (Kagan, 2006). These conditions are attributed to 
America’s support to corrupt and tyrannical regimes. U.S. 
economic blockades led to a major “humanitarian crisis,” 
and widespread suffering of Iraqi people in the 1990s 
(Lynch, 2005, p. 99), which served to unity a then divided 
Arab community against America. As America sets the rules 
for a world economy, many perceive that millions “simply 
have no chance to take part” and will suffer for it 
(Englund, 2001). What America calls globalization, many 
foreigners view as “Americanization,” through U.S. policies 
that will serves U.S. economic interest while increasing 
the gap between the world’s rich and poor nations. 
4. The Arms Trade  
Though there have been no wars between world 
superpowers since World War II, there have been over 200 
wars, coups and revolutions, of which the overwhelming 
majority have been fought in the third world (Blewett, 
2000). A source on criticism of America comes into play 
when considering how the combatants were armed to fight 
these conflicts, and the many deaths that they account for. 
For example, in 1992 alone, The United States accounted for 
46 percent of arms trades delivered to third world 
countries (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). Between 
1945 and 1989, approximate 23 million deaths occurred in 
wars in the third world. Between 1970 and 1989, the Middle 
East, Africa, the Far East, South Asia, and Latin America 
were sent $388 billion in weapons. Of that $388 billion,  
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the two major superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United 
States, accounted for 69 percent of the weapons transfers, 
and over 40 percent went to the Middle East (1995). 
Still today, the United States transfers the highest 
amount of small arms to unstable countries (Lobe, 2007). 
From the foreign publics’ point of view, America is a major 
enabler of the war and conflict that makes their world less 
safe. Chernus states that Pakistan’s “democracy movement 
will now be suppressed with weapons sent and paid for by 
us, the American taxpayers” (2007). Arms trading is seen as 
another demonstration of how America puts its political and 
economical interests above everything else. Although some 
argue that smaller governments need these arms in order to 
secure peace in their nation, dissenters argue that in many 
cases, American arms actually end up in the hands of 
opposition parties to fuel conflict or support coups in 
countries where American interest may be in jeopardy or 
where America is at odds with that country’s government. 
For example, the U.S. has armed and trained groups like the 
Taliban, despite their dishonorable human rights records, 
in order to further U.S. political interests (Rubin, 2002). 
In other cases, strategic considerations may take a back 
seat to protecting jobs and the U.S. arms industry. 
D. WHO AMERICA IS: PERVERSE, NAÏVE, & SELF-RIGHTEOUS 
The final major category of reasons for anti-
Americanism, most prominent in Arab nations, consists of 
characteristics that some foreigners think define the 




identified with perversity. This perverse identity is 
considered to be evident from America’s contagious cultural 
perversity, blind naivety, and self-righteous patriotism. 
1. Cultural Contamination 
This section presents negative attributes that are 
cited about the American culture. The culture is perceived 
as one plagued by overindulgence and violence, and as a 
culture that spreads and compromises other cultures. 
a.  Occidentalism: American Overindulgence and 
Gluttony 
 Similar to the divide amongst opinions within the 
American population about the positive and negative 
attributes of American culture, some in the foreign public 
admire American culture, and others consider it a perverse 
culture. Those who look at it as perverse also resent the 
fact that its popularity is infecting their own culture, 
especially their youth. In the book, Occidentalism (2005), 
Buruma and Margalit reveal four criticisms of Western world 
that are a source of hatred, particularly from the Easter 
world: 1) sinful decadent cosmopolitan cities; 2) 
materialism and focus on commerce and comfort over 
sacrifice; 3) machinelike, scientific society without a 
soul; and 4) idolatry or the worship of these evils. Some 
of the foreign public view American society as a 
magnification of all of these perversities. 
 Literature points to different assertions from 
the foreign public as to how these perversities manifest 
themselves. One perceived manifestation is American 
obesity. 
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Compared with other nations the Americans are not 
just big, but super-size. Yet this obsession with 
obese Americans is about more than body fat. 
Certainly there is a debate to be had about the 
extent to which obesity is a problem in America - 
a discussion best left to medical experts. But a 
close examination of the popular genre on obesity 
reveals it is about more than consumption in the 
most literal sense of eating food. Obesity has 
become a metaphor for 'over-consumption' more 
generally. Affluence is blamed not just for 
bloated bodies, but for a society which is seen 
as more generally too big for its own good. (Ben-
Ami, 2005) 
 America’s obesity epidemic is well documented. In 
2006, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
estimated that 65 percent of American adults were 
overweight, and over 30 percent of American children were 
obese, based on body fat index (2006). Some foreigners 
simply consider it a symptom of American overindulgence and 
gluttony. 
b.  Violence 
 Another perceived manifestation of American 
perversity that is often cited in literature is U.S. 
violent crime statistics, which are the highest in the 
industrialized world (Giddens, 2001). 
There are more reported murders each year in 
Detroit, with a population of just over one-and-
a-half million, than in the whole of the United 
Kingdom, which has a population of just over 
fifty-eight million people. (Giddens, 2001, p. 
185) 
 In 1991 a U.S. Senate Judiciary committee report 
concluded that the United States as “the most violent and 
self-destructive nation on earth,” with the highest rates 
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of rape (National Center for Victims of Crime, 1992), 
murder and violent crime of all democracies (Weiner, 1991). 
These statistics are well known by foreign countries, and 
many of the statistics are kept and monitored in the UN 
today. In addition, America has had periods where its rates 
of poverty, rape, violent crimes, and prison populations 
were higher than nearly all other nations in the Western 
world (e.g., Weiner, 1991; Vicini, 2006). The foreign 
public views a nation in which 82 percent claim to be 
Christians, according to the Pew Research Center surveys 
(March, 2002), as one of the most immoral nations on earth. 
That alone speaks to the potential resentment toward 
America’s predominant religion, Christianity, from people 
of other religions. 
c.  Compromises Foreign Values 
 Some of the foreign public have less resentment 
toward American culture than they do to the fact that it 
seems to be contaminating their own culture, particularly 
their youth. A prime example of this can be found in Iran. 
For the article, Fugitives; a reporter at large (2005), 
Laura Secor interviewed several hard-line Islamic 
fundamentalists that were loyal to the Islamic Republic 
system in Iran. They were elated at the prospect of 
President Ahmadinejad restoring Islamic ethics that had 
been undermined by western culture and policies under 
Iran’s previous president, President Khatami. 
Fundamentalist explained how western values had begun to 
turn their once pure culture into one in which vulgarity, 
sexual promiscuity, and drug abuse, which had become more 
prevalent among the youth. They wanted the new president to 
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rid their society of what they perceived as western 
entertainment leading to the country falling into moral 
confusion and disarray. One interviewee testified that 
although some Iranians say that they want more freedom, 
they cannot define it; therefore they invent their own 
definitions based on what they see in western culture 
(2005). Their concern is that many of ways that western 
cultures express freedom goes against Islamic values. 
 The cultural resentment is not limited to Iran. A 
large portion of fundamentalist Muslims refer to themselves 
as Salafis, or followers of Muhammad with a puritanical 
approach to Islam. These Muslim are united in their common 
emphasis on “deculturation,” considering culture and human 
intellect as the enemy of true Islam (Wiktoorwicz, 2006, p. 
210). They welcome more government crackdowns on bloggers, 
internet pornography, sexual improprieties and more. 
Fundamentalists’ view of Islam can be summed in one 
statement by Ali Belashabadi, one of Secor’s young 
fundamentalist interviewees, “this is our identity as 
Muslims” (Secor, 2005). They resent America for challenging 
their identity. 
2. Naivety: America Does Not Understand Why it is 
Hated 
In the eyes of many foreigners, their disdain for 
America is further exacerbated by the perception that many 
Americans “simply don’t get it” (Milne, 2001). The foreign 
public views the American public as persistently naive as 
to the reasons that America is disliked. Only in the 
aftershock of the September 11, 2001 attacks, did many 
Americans even realize that anti-American sentiment existed 
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and was widespread throughout the world. Soon after the 
attacks, President Bush declared that America had been 
"awakened to danger" and "called to defend freedom" (BBC 
News, September 2001). As one self-proclaimed “reluctant 
fundamentalist” put it, when he mentioned U.S. actions that 
have caused anarchy, pain and suffering around the world, 
like “the final [U.S.] campaign [in Pakistan] of the Cold 
War…few [Americans] seemed to know much about it” (Hamid, 
2007). As another columnist put it, Americans are 
“willfully ignorant of the rest of the world….Foreigners 
amount to ‘remote little people on TV’” (Englund, 2001). 
Foreigners also argue that the Americans that do 
understand that they are hated attribute the hatred to the 
wrong things. Even before September 11th, President Clinton 
stated to the world that U.S. strikes in Sudan in 1998 were 
"a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism" 
(CNN, 20 August 1998). In 2004, the U.S. National Security 
Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, referred to the attackers as 
“radical, freedom-hating terrorists” (Rice, 2004). Today, 
President Bush maintains that attacks on America correlated 
to attacks on democratic freedom, as evident from the 
language used throughout the most recent United States 
National Security Strategy (President Bush, 2006). It 
appears that this assumption alone, and the language used 
to articulate it, is offensive to some of the foreign 
public. Many foreigners believe that the attacks on America 
were a result of direct hatred for America and its actions, 
not hatred for democracy and freedom. The belief that 
Americans do not understand this is perceived as evidence 
of America’s self-righteousness. 
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3. Perceived Patriotism & Self Righteousness 
Since George Bush's father inaugurated his new 
world order a decade ago, the US, supported by 
its British ally, bestrides the world like a 
colossus… It is this record of unabashed national 
egotism and arrogance that drives anti-
Americanism among swaths of the world's 
population, for whom there is little democracy in 
the current distribution of global wealth and 
power. (Milne, 2001) 
Some in the foreign public view President Bush’s 
stance on the September 11th attacks as attacks on freedom 
and democracy, as not only a display of America’s ignorance 
of its wrongdoings, but as a self-righteous notion. 
Speaking of America as if it is synonymous with freedom can 
be viewed as a display of indifference to other political 
systems and other countries in the ‘free world’ (Gadahan, 
2001). Some dissenters argue that the September 11th 
terrorist targets were not icons of freedom and democracy; 
rather, they were icons of U.S. commerce, the U.S. 
military, and the U.S. political leadership, all 
instruments of U.S. foreign policy (Petras, 2001).  
Others argue that the terrorism was a tactic – a “tool 
of the weak versus the strong” (Bandow, 2003). They argue 
that attacks on America were a desperate attempt by a 
weaker opponent, whom had limited options for exerting 
influence over the United States, to strike back at America 
for its perceived wrongdoings against the attackers’ 
countries, people and culture. Of the many different 
factors to which people attribute the attacks, very few 
outside of the United States attribute the attacks to the 
terrorists’ hatred for democracy and freedom. The foreign 
public generally does not think that pride in one's own 
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country is wrong as long as that pride is informed with 
knowledge of the weaknesses and wrongdoings of one’s 
country. 
E. MISCELLANEOUS OTHER SOURCES OF RESENTMENT 
In addition to the reasons listed above, America’s 
missile defense policy, perceived shortsightedness, and 
maltreatment of foreign captives are also noted in multiple 
sources as causes of anti-Americanism. America garnered 
resentment from the international community for President 
Bush’s vow to press forward with a missile defense plan, 
and U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty (Federation of American Scientists, 2001). This 
decision widened the growing rift between America and its 
allies, as Europeans “[came] down firmly” against America’s 
stance on this issue (Pew Research Center, August 2001). 
Today, America’s missile defense program is in full swing, 
headed by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency. Resentment 
toward America has also been attributed to what foreigners 
perceive as a general “lack of visionary leadership” 
(Kennedy, 2002). America is accused of adopting short-term 
strategies that do not take into account long-term 
implications, particularly when the United States takes 
military or economic actions that have long-term 
humanitarian effects (Gerges, 2005). Lastly, America is 
accused of hypocrisy in its treatment of prisoners, 
particularly Arab prisoners, which has been cited as a 
source of resentment. Allegations of torture (Chernus, 




(Financial Times, 2007), and the Abu Ghraib incident 
(Hersh, 2004) are all alluded to in different pieces of 
literature. 
In summation, worldwide anti-Americanism is attributed 
to many factors that foreigners vigorously defend. There is 
surely no shortage of opinions on the reasons for this 
resentment. Although literature reveals a great variation 
of reasons for this resentment, since September 11th, there 
has been little disagreement that this widespread 
resentment exists. Research organizations appear to have 
taken Elmenshawy’s sentiments to heart, and have collected 
years of quality polling data, which validates and 
quantifies the resentment. Fortunately, much of the polling 
data is comprised of survey results that came directly from 
the source, the foreign public. 
F. POLLING DATA: TRENDS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM, 2001 - 
PRESENT 
1. Opinions in Western Europe, Pre-September 11th 
Anyone who believes in the importance of U.S.-
European relations can only hope that the Bush 
administration will take these poll results to 
heart and return to the principle - articulated 
by the president during last fall's campaign - 
that the United States can accomplish its goals 
in the world only if it takes into account the 
interests of others. If it does, the 
administration can attract broad public support 
for policies on global warming, missile defense 
and other issues which advance the interests of 
people living on both sides of the Atlantic. If 
it does not, the poll results being released 
today suggest that we might well be facing a 
serious deterioration in trans-Atlantic relations 
which cannot be ameliorated by traditional 
diplomacy. (Halperin, 2001)  
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Since September 11th, organizations have attempted to 
collect survey data in order to shed some light on the 
trend and sources of hatred and resentment toward America. 
One of those organizations, the Pew Research Center (PRC), 
conducted particularly intriguing polls over the past seven 
years. The polls reveal enlightening facts on the nature of 
the negative trend that appears to validate the widespread 
existence of anti-American resentment. In choosing to use 
these polls for this study, an important factor that was 
considered was the fact that this organization went 
directly to the Arab public for their opinions. With one 
exception, their findings were not based on the opinions of 
politicians, so-called Middle East experts, nor Arab 
Americans; rather, citizens in Middle Eastern countries 
like, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were 
asked questions about their opinions of America and issues 
facing their society. Additionally, the foreign public in 
Western European nations like Great Britain, France, and 
Germany were asked about their opinions of America. This 
methodology speaks to the credibility and relevance of the 
polling results in assessing foreign public opinion. 
Collectively, several of these polling results help to 
uncover some intricacies about the foreign public’s 
resentment for America, which will then be analyzed through 
attribute mapping to suggest how America can prioritize its 
effort to reverse these negative trends. 
PRC conducted one poll, as part of its Global 
Attitudes Project, just one month before September 11th. 
This poll gauged public opinion of approximate 4,000 
people, in four major nations in Western Europe - Great 
Britain, Italy, Germany and France. The results reveal that 
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even before September 11th, foreign opinion of American had 
begun to suffer. President Bush was highly unpopular, as 
the public disapproved of his handling of international 
policy. President Bush’s foreign policy approval rating was 
40 to 60 percentage points below President Clinton’s (Pew 
Research Center, August 2001). Over 73 to 85 percent in 
each country say that President Bush made decisions based 
entirely on U.S. interests. The great majority also stated 
that President Bush understood less about Europe than 
previous American presidents, and less than 18 percent said 
that he considered Europe in his decisions. 
 
Table 1.   European Views on President Bush (From: Pew 
Research Center, August 2001) 
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The polling data noted two major unilateral decisions 
that the United States made that did not sit well with the 
foreign public. First was the U.S. decision to abandon the 
Kyoto Protocol, which Europeans opposed by approximately an 
eight-to-one margin (Pew Research Center, August 2001). The 
second unilateralist decision was the U.S. stance on 
continuing missile defense, which 65 to 83 percent 
disapprove of the U.S. decision. Though the polling data 
indicated that the European public was divided when asked 
whether basic interests of Europe and the United States 
grew closer, further apart, or neither, it seemed clear 
that there was a growing concern for American neglect for 
European interest, and a clear sign of low confidence 
ratings for President Bush. 
 
Q.4  As I read some specific policies of [American] President George 
W. Bush 
 tell me if you approve or disapprove of them.  
  List items were rotated 
  Approve Disapprove Don’t know/Refused      
a. Bush’s decision that the U.S. should not support the Kyoto 
protocol to reduce 
 greenhouse gas emissions 
US 29 44 27=100         
BRIT 10 83 7=100         
ITA 12 80 8=100         
GER 10 87 3=100         
FRA 10 85 5=100         
  
b. Bush’s decision that the U.S. should try to develop a missile 
defense system 
 even if it means withdrawing from the ABM treaty 
US 39 42 19=100         
BRIT 20 66 14=100         
ITA 24 65 11=100         
GER 10 83 7=100         
FRA 14 75 11=100   
Table 2.   European Views on President Bush Decisions 
(From: Pew Research Center, August 2001) 
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2. Opinions Leaders’ observations, Post-September 
11th, Pre-Iraq 
A second PRC poll, the only poll used in this study 
that is not based on a representative sample of the general 
public, used a methodology that consisted of assessing the 
observations of ‘opinion leaders,’ or influential people 
across five categories - politics, media, business, culture 
and government (Pew Research Center, December 2001). From 
the U.S. point of view, these 275 opinion leaders are 
closer to the foreign public than Americans are, and their 
observations can provide a useful gauge of the public 
opinions in their countries. Future polling research that 
was conducted by PRC collected opinions directly from the 
public, which served to validate this study. This phased 
approach to polling meshes well with the attribute mapping 
methodology discussed in Chapter III.  
Similar to the results in the pre-September 11th 
survey, 63 to 75 percent of foreign opinion leaders felt 
that the United States was conducting the war on terrorism 
without regard for the interests of its allies (Pew 
Research Center, December 2001). In contrast, 70 percent of 
U.S. opinion leaders felt that America was acting 
multilaterally. Over half of the foreign opinion leaders 
thought the war on terror should be confined to Afghanistan 
and opposed extending the war into Iraq or Somalia, even if 
it was discovered that the regimes in those nations 
supported terrorist activities. With only 29 percent 
supporting a war outside of Afghanistan if the evidence 




resentment, since there is no solid case that Iraq 
supported the terrorist attacks, and America invaded Iraq 
in 2003 anyway. 
 
 
Table 3.   Foreign Views on American Multilateralism and 
Iraq (From: Pew Research Center, December 2001) 
To uncover reasons why the foreign public disliked the 
United States, opinion leaders were asked whether six 
factors had a minor, major or no impact on their publics’ 
dislike of America (Pew Research Center, December 2001). 
Four factors stood out: American power, American 
contribution to the gap between the rich and poor, American 
support for Israel, and the power of America’s 
multinational corporations. In the Arab nations, the 
primary reasons for disliking America were American support 
to Israel, and America’s contribution to the gap between 
the rich and poor. Western European opinion leaders rated 
U.S. power very highly as a source of distain, as well as 
U.S. contribution to the rich-poor gap. Overall, a 73 
percent majority believed that America was too supportive 
of Israel (Pew Research Center, December 2001). The highest 
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number of Western Europeans, 59 percent, rated the power of 




Table 4.   Foreign Views on Reasons for Disliking the U.S. 
(From: Pew Research Center, December 2001) 
Despite these sources of resentment, the opinion 
leaders’ assessments of America’s overall popularity 
ratings were relatively high, post-September 11th. Eighty-
one percent of opinion leaders in Western Europe thought 
that their public had a mostly favorable opinion of 
America. In the Muslim world, where one might suspect that 
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan could destroy public 
opinion of America, opinion in Arab nations was nearly 
split even, with a slight edge toward a mostly favorable 
opinion (Pew Research Center, December 2001). 
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Table 5.   Foreign Favorability Ratings of Americans (From: 
Pew Research Center, December 2001) 
3. Unfavorable Opinion of the U.S. on the Rise 
Despite an initial outpouring of public sympathy 
for America following the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, discontent with the United 
States has grown around the world over the past 
two years. Images of the U.S. have been tarnished 
in all types of nations: among long time NATO 
allies, in developing countries, in Easter Europe 
and, most dramatically, in Muslim societies. (Pew 
Research Center, December 2002, p. 1) 
In 2002, PRC followed its opinion leader poll with a 
comprehensive public poll. It consisted of mostly face-to-
face interviews of 38,000 people, in 44 nations, in 63 
different languages. The surveys covered a large array of 
issues from local economics, to global conflict, to 
immigration, to health care, to public opinion of foreign 
countries. Notable findings about American included the 
fact that 44 to 75 percent of Western Europeans thought 
that the U.S. desire to control Iraqi oil was the principle 
reason the U.S. was considering war with Iraq (p. 4). In 
contrast, only 22 percent of Americans agreed. Despite 
resentment worldwide, 35 of 42 countries still gave the 
U.S. positive ratings, though ratings were down from 
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previous years. Western Europe gave America a 61 to 75 
percent favorable rating, down from where the opinion 
leaders rated America in 2001 (Pew Research Center, 
December 2002, p. 1). Also notably lower than in 2001, Arab 
nations gave America a 6 to 35 percent favorable rating, 
with the exception of Uzbekistan, which did not participate 
in 2001 (p. 53). Uzbekistan, “a new U.S. ally in [the] 
fight against terror,” rated America at 85 percent (p. 54). 
 
 
Table 6.   Foreign Favorability Ratings of the U.S. (From: 
Pew Research Center, 2002, p. 54) 
Though still very low, opinions in Western Europe on 
American unilateralism were either slightly better than the 
opinion leaders had suspected according to the 2001 poll, 
or favorable opinions actually increased from about 34 
percent to about an average of 39 percent in 2002 (p. 58). 
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Table 7.   Foreign Views on U.S. Unilateralism and GWOT 
(From: Pew Research Center, 2002, p. 58) 
Other notable findings include the fact the most of the 
foreign public thought that “U.S. policies serve[d] to 
widen the global economic divide” (Pew Research Center, 
December 2002, p. 61); most rejected Americanization of 
their culture (p. 63); people were divided on their opinion 
of American-style democracy (p. 64); most liked American 
technology and entertainment (p. 66); and most thought 
unfavorably about American business practices (p. 68). 
4. Iraq Invasion: Resentment Continues, 2003-2004 
Opinion polls have been conducted every year since 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began in 2003, and they 
reveal the continued trend of worldwide negative opinion of 
America. In evaluating the collective results, several 
themes emerge: 1) American credibility and policy motives 
are always in questions; 2) American unilateralism has led  
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its traditional allies to desire more independence from 
U.S. policies; and 3) few support America’s military 
actions. 
In March 2003, less than a week before the invasion of 
Iraq began, America’s rating had plummeted with its allies 
in Western Europe. Although negative opinions were 
attributed more to President Bush (p. 5) than America in 
general, U.S. favorability ratings dropped from 61 to 75 
percent in 2002, to a dismal 25 to 48 percent in 2003 (Pew 
Research Center, 2003, p. 1). Spain, which was not surveyed 
in 2002, gave America only a 14 percent favorability 
rating, down from 50 percent in a 1999-2000 poll conducted 
by the U.S. Department of State. The polls revealed support 
in Western Europe for weakening its ties with America on 
security and diplomatic affairs (p. 2). Though most thought 
that the war’s outcome would make the Iraqi people better 
off, and the Middle East more stable (p. 4), still 73 to 81 
percent of Europe, except Great Britain, did not support 
the war (p. 1). Even in Great Britain, slightly more than 
half did not support the war.  
In May 2003, just after the official conclusion of the 
Iraq war and the fall of Saddam Hussein, U.S. favorability 
ratings saw a short-lived increase – though still to a 
level that was lower than the 2002 ratings. However, 2004 
polls revealed that America still had “credibility” 
problems as the favorability ratings dropped again (Pew 
Research Center, 2004, p. 1). In addition, polling data 
showed a steady increase in Western Europeans’ desire for 
foreign and security policy independent of the United 
States. About half of U.S. and British citizens felt that 
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their leaders had simply been misinformed about WMDs, while 
an overwhelming majority of the rest of the world felt that 
U.S. leaders actually lied about WMDs (p. 15). Despite the 
low favorability ratings on America itself, Europeans have 
much higher favorability ratings of American people (p. 7). 
The majority of people in the Arab nations surveyed doubted 
America’s sincerity in its Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 
saying it was actually an effort to “control Middle East 
oil and to dominate the world” (p. 1). Additionally, in 
Muslim nations only 5 to 30 percent gave America a 
favorable rating (p. 6), and 52 to 73 percent rated 
Christians unfavorably (p. 5). 
5. America Resented Today More Than Ever, 2005-2007 
Foreign public opinion of America has not improved. 
Between 2005 and 2007, American favorability ratings have 
only slightly fluctuated up or down, and have remained 
overwhelming low. The gap between positive and negative 
opinions of America have not grown significantly wider in 
most countries, but the number of countries that give 
America negative favorability ratings has increased (Pew 
Research Center, 2007, p. 3). The good news for the United 
States is that as polling questions have improved over the 
years, more apparent trends have emerged that indicate not 
just that America is resented, but the reasons why, how 
significant those reasons are, and clues as to what 
segments of the foreign public show opinion variations. 
For example, PRC’s 2005 poll revealed a slight 
variation in public opinion in the Muslim world based on 
age and gender. Of six Muslim countries, the median U.S. 
favorability ratings were found to be 7.5 percent and 5 
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percent higher among people less than 35 years of age and 
among women respectively (Pew Research Center, 2005, p. 
14). Though Arabs were divided over the causes of the 
transition from resentment to Islamic extremism, the 
highest percentage of responses pointed to U.S. policies 
and influence, poverty and lack of jobs, and lack of 
education (p. 25). In addition, the majority of respondents 
felt that democracy could work in their country (p. 33), 
but Islam needed to play a great role in politics (p. 35). 
The latest PRC poll revealed that America’s 
favorability ratings were low, but ratings of the American 
people were somewhat better (Pew Research Center, 2007, pp. 
88-89). Still only 5 to 33 percent in Western Europe felt 
that the United States took into account the interests of 
other countries (p. 97); and 54 to 73 percent in Western 
Europe and the Middle East still feel that America’s 
policies increase the gap between the rich and the poor (p. 
98). Fifty-four to 90 percent consider it a bad thing if 
American ideas and customs spread to their country (p. 99). 
Although Islamic nations think that democracy could work in 
their country, most dislike American ideas about democracy 
(p. 100), citing that America mostly promotes democracy 
only where it serves their interest (p. 106). Today, Arab 
nations overwhelmingly are opposed the U.S. led war on 
terror, think that U.S. troops should leave Iraq and 
Afghanistan, feel that America favors Israel unfairly, and 
feel that America is the biggest environmental threat to 
the world (pp. 115-129). Even more interesting is the fact 
that our allies in Western Europe mostly agree with that 
assessment. The 2007 pools reveal that environment issues 
are becoming an increasing source for concern for most 
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countries around the world, and unless America, as the 
nation most harmful to the environment, does not take a 
more active role in resolving the issues, it may become a 
source of even greater resentment in the coming years. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Some argue that there has always been an anti-American 
sentiment, and the war in Iraq has just revived it. Others 
blame a recent radicalization of American foreign policy 
under President Bush. Still others attribute it to a long 
history of U.S. policies and actions that have mostly 
belittled the significance of long-term impacts. Arguably, 
resentment stems from a combination these factors. 
Interestingly, even in places around the world where there 
is ramped anti-Americanism, one will most likely also find 
widespread affection for some American things. Despite this 
fact, many believe that American should not “lightly 
dismiss the current hostility toward the United 
States….International legitimacy matters” (Kagan, 2006). 
Given the circumstance, what can America do to address 
deteriorating foreign public opinion? With there being such 
great variation in public opinion on the reasons for 
resentment, this study suggests that a preceding and more 
important question is, ‘Of all the reasons, which should 
America attempt to address?’ Given the fiscal reality and 
resource limitations, American cannot, nor should it, 
realistically implement a plan to counteract all of the 
factors that cause resentment. If one accepts that idea, 




chapter suggests a framework for analyzing the factors in 
order to answer this question and support resource 
allocation decisions. 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
A. REFRAMING THE PROBLEM 
As introduced in previous chapters, the second phase 
of this study is intended to propose a framework for 
analyzing the relative importance of individual factors 
that were identified as sources of resentment toward 
America. Despite the fact that the United States government 
and nonprofit organizations have taken traditional and 
innovative measures to curb unfavorable public opinion and 
improve international relations, polling data seems to 
indicate that these efforts have not had lasting results. A 
few examples of these efforts include foreign exchange 
programs (Courteau, 2005), foreign economic aid (Pincus, 
2007), media campaigns (Albiniak, 2001), humanitarian aid 
and disaster relief efforts (Ballen, 2006). To varying 
degrees, programs involving every instrument of national 
power, information, economic, diplomatic, and military 
means, have been utilized in this effort. This study 
suggests that the overall lack of success in swaying public 
opinion may not be due to a lack of effort, but possibly to 
a flawed focus. 
Rather than looking at new innovative solutions, this 
study takes a step backward to look at an inventive way of 
looking at the problem. In the world of business and 
profit, companies are continually forced to find innovative 
ways to look at problems, in order to remain competitive.  
As such, many of tools, techniques and best practices have 
been developed in the business world for framing companies’  
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problems, which then allow companies to determine how to 
best bring value to their customers. One of these 
techniques is called attribute mapping. 
B. ATTRIBUTE MAPPING IN THE BUSINESS WORLD 
In the corporate sector, one of the simplest ways to 
improve on the value brought to customers is through the 
process of redesigning a company’s existing offerings 
(products and services). The end goal of redesign is to 
establish a “blockbuster” design that so strongly appeals 
to specific target markets that it compels them to buy 
(McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 23). A simple technique 
that can be used to identify opportunities for redesign is 
called attribute mapping. This technique gives managers the 
insight to predict how specific customer segments will 
respond to specific attributes in a product, which then 
arms managers with the knowledge to optimize their resource 
investments and strengthen their product’s value for the 
customers. 
Ian MacMillan and Rita Gunther McGrath first 
introduced the analytic technique of attribute mapping in 
1996 in the publication, Harvard Business Review (pp. 58-
73). They further expanded on the idea and other 
opportunity identification techniques in their 2000 book, 
The Entrepreneurial Mindset. MacMillan and McGrath suggest 
that product or service attributes present opportunities 
that are not blatantly obvious to managers. Attribute 
mapping allows managers to develop rational product 
strategies, despite the presence of seemingly irrational 
customer behavior. A rational strategy must also be 
profitable, which means giving customers a sufficient mix 
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of product attributes that they value. If a company does 
not sufficiently invest into attributes that customers 
value, it will lose the customers. If it invests too much 
into attributes that customers do not value, then the 
company loses profit. 
Two keys to the attribute map deserve emphasis. First, 
there is the idea of what customers value, versus what 
customers want. Managers should focus on identifying what 
the customers value, and not just what customers say they 
want. Customers often will say they want special 
attributes, but the attribute map helps managers determine 
how important those special attributes are to the 
customers. All attributes come at a cost. How much is the 
customer willing to give up in terms of money, convenience, 
size, or time in order to have that attribute? Is that 
attribute a deal breaker or just a nice-to-have? Attribute 
mapping helps managers to make this determination before 
making decisions to redesign their offering. 
The second key is that the attribute mapping process 
is simple and repeatable. The commercial marketplace is 
constantly evolving. Customers want product ‘A’ one year 
and product ‘B’ the next year. Competitors offer attributes 
‘C’ and ‘D’ one month, and then attributes ‘E’ and ‘F’ the 
next month. Societal changes like those in fashion, in 
healthcare, in the economy or in the environment create 
constant change in customers needs. Corporate acquisitions 
and mergers, business failures, business strategy 
adjustments, or the growth of new small businesses create 
constant change in the competitive environment. In an 
environment of constant change, attribute mapping gives 
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managers a repeatable process for redesigning their 
offerings to ensure the best mix of attributes for the 
current environment. 
C. UNDERSTANDING THE ATTRIBUTE MAP 
1. Getting Started 
The attribute map, shown in Table 8, simplifies the 
complexity in analyzing customer needs and a company’s 
position in the market with respect to its competitors. To 
develop an attribute map, the user must first identify an 
offering and an important customer segment for that 
offering. Next, the user must categorize the attributes of 
the offering according to the categories in Table 8. 
 
 Basic Discriminators Energizers 
Positive Nonnegotiables Differentiators Exciters 




Neutral So-whats Parallel differentiators 
No such 
beast 
Table 8.   Attribute Map (After: McGrath and MacMillan, 
2005) 
The three columns in the attribute map help categorize 
attributes as basic, discriminating, or energizing (McGrath 
and MacMillan, 2000, p. 26). These columns are used to 
indicate the level of excitement that certain features 
generate for the customer, relative to competing offerings. 
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A basic feature generates no excitement. If in customers’ 
judgments, a feature is basic, then the customer takes for 
granted that any competitor could offer it. A discriminator 
is a feature that generates some excitement, meaning that 
customers consider this feature as one that positively or 
negatively distinguishes a product. Lastly, an energizer is 
a feature that generates great passion. If the customers 
judge a feature to be an energizer, then this feature may 
dominate the customers buying decision. 
The three rows in the attribute map categorize the 
attitudes that customers could have toward a feature 
(McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 25). Positive features are 
those that the customer likes, or would rather have. 
Negative features are those that the customer dislikes, or 
would rather do without. Lastly, neutral features are those 
that the customer does not care about, or would feel the 
same about whether the feature was included or not. 
2. Positive Attributes 
When customer attitudes are positive toward certain 
features of an offering, it is more valuable to them, and 
they may even be willing to pay a premium price for it. 
Each type of positive feature requires the manager to take 
a different approach. The first type, a basic positive 
feature, is referred to as Nonnegotiable (McGrath and 
MacMillan, 2000, p. 26). Customers regard nonnegotiable 
features as standard, almost as a feature that the producer 
is obligated to provide as a matter of course. Most 
competitors offer this feature, so if a company does not 
offer it, then their product is perceived as inferior. In 
mature industries, there are usually many nonnegotiables, 
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while newer industries have many fewer. For example, in the 
automobile industry, features like air conditioners and 
built-in radios are now nonnegotiable attributes, though 
two decades ago they were special features. 
Nonnegotiables can be a headache for managers. These 
features are usually not profitable. Having these features 
does not guarantee that a company will sell more products, 
but not having them almost certainly ensures that its 
product will not sell. Often, a company can expend valuable 
resources, and decrease their profit margin in order to 
produce nonnegotiables, only to have the consumer 
completely take these features for granted. 
The second type of positive feature, discriminating 
attributes, are referred to as differentiators (p. 27). 
Differentiators set a company’s offering apart from its 
competitors’ in a positive way, as the offering has 
features that competitors’ offerings do not. All else 
equal, the more differentiators a product has, the more 
likely a customer’s buying decision will be swayed in that 
product’s favor. Like nonnegotiables, differentiators also 
can sometimes go unnoticed unless the existence and 
benefits of these features are well communicated to the 
consumer. 
The last type of positive feature, a positively 
energizing feature, is referred to as an Exciter (McGrath 
and MacMillan, 2000, p. 27). These features are so 
overwhelmingly attractive to the customer, that they 




purchasing decision. Since the perfect product does not 
exist, every product has drawbacks. Exciters can help to 
counterbalance the drawbacks in offerings. 
According to McGrath and MacMillan, managers will 
often misinterpret what their exciters are (2005). Managers 
will intuitively correlate the company’s expense and 
difficulty of including a feature with the excitement that 
customers will feel about the feature. In reality, exciters 
can often be features that are technically simple and 
inexpensive to produce. For example, Honda introduced the 
cup holder in 1988 as a standard feature in its 
automobiles. Honda credits this development with their 
emergence as the best-selling automobile in the United 
States for at least a five year period (McGrath and 
MacMillan, 2000, p. 28). With little else to differentiate 
cars in Honda’s class, this small feature that made 
peoples’ lives more convenient caused a big stir, and swung 
millions of buyers in Honda’s direction. 
3. Negative Attributes 
Since no product is perfect, an offering will 
inevitably have some attributes that certain customer 
segments find undesirable. When customers attitudes are 
negative toward certain attributes of an offering, this is 
a great opportunity for innovation. Find a solution that 
eliminates or mitigates the negative aspects of an 
offering, and a competitive advantage will have been gained 
if the competitors do not address their negative 
attributes. The best way to determine what these negative 
attributes are, aside from asking the customers themselves, 
is to ask a company’s customer service, technical support, 
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complaint handling and sales department staffs (McGrath and 
MacMillan, 2000, p. 30). These employees deal with the 
customers on a regular basis; but unfortunately, management 
sometimes leaves their input out of redesign decisions, 
instead relying on input from engineering or product 
development departments. Although employees can be a great 
source of input, if major redesign decisions are made based 
solely on their input, then a company could discover that 
some assumptions that their employees made about customer 
attitudes were wrong. If employee input is used, then it 
should be validated with customer feedback. 
The first type of negative attribute is a basic 
negative feature, referred to as a Tolerable (McGrath and 
MacMillan, 2000, p. 30). Customers regard tolerables as 
negative attributes that they can deal with. For example, 
some customers consider short battery life a tolerable 
attribute in certain cellular phones. They may accept this 
drawback because the phone has differentiators or exciters 
like an esthetically pleasing look, or a digital music 
player with great sound quality. The problem with having a 
tolerable attribute is that as soon as a competitor 
develops a product that is free of that attribute, all else 
being equal, customers will find a product with that 
attribute less valuable. 
Of even greater concern is the second type of negative 
attribute, dissatisfiers. Dissatisfiers are negatively 
discriminating attributes that put a product in an inferior 
position to its competitors. Unlike differentiators, which 
could go relatively unnoticed if they are not well marketed 
to the consumer, dissatisfiers will usually be noticed 
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quickly, and will more quickly sway purchasing decisions. 
Bad news spreads more quickly and louder than good news, 
which brings us to the last negative attribute, enragers. 
Enragers are negative energizers, and should be 
avoided at all costs. This category consists of the 
attributes that are so overwhelmingly negative, that they 
can stir negative emotions like fear or disgust from 
customers (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, p. 32). Enragers 
can occur due to a company’s lack of ability to predict 
customer reaction, or it can result from unanticipated 
events and misfortunes, like the 2006 E. coli spinach 
outbreak in the United States (CNN.com, 2006). This event 
not only dramatically reduced sales for the company that 
was the source of the spinach, but for all other bagged 
spinach companies. 
4. Neutral Attributes 
There are two types of neutral customer responses to 
certain attributes. McGrath and MacMillan refer to the 
neutral basic response as “so-what?” (2000, pp. 33-34). 
“So-what” attributes are those that the customer does not 
care about, so it has minimal to no impact on their buying 
decision. “So-what” attributes may stem from features that 
were important in the past, but are no longer important. 
For example, one could argue that computer floppy disc 
drives were a nonnegotiable in the 1990s computer industry. 
In 2007, with the increased size of basic electronic files, 
and the advent of high storage capacity USB memory devices, 
many computers do not come with floppy disc drives and most 
customers do not care.  
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“So-what” attributes can also stem from features that 
specific customer segments want, though other segments may 
not care about nor be willing to pay for. For example, many 
Verizon Wireless cellular customers may say that they want 
to be able to watch news broadcasts instantly on their 
cellular phones, but how valuable of an attribute is it 
really? Although certain customer segments will pay for it, 
other customers want the attribute if it is free, but are 
not willing to pay for it. 
Including “so-what” attributes in an offering could 
mean wasted resources and lower profit margins. However, in 
analyzing the “so-what” attributes, managers must recognize 
that attributes that are “so-what” to some customers may be 
positive attributes to another. Possible solutions to this 
conflict are to either create different offerings for 
customer segments with different needs, to determine who 
the most important customer segment is and focus on their 
needs, or to make an offering customizable. 
The last category of neutral attributes are referred 
to as Parallel Differentiators (2000, pp. 35). Parallels 
are separate offerings that are positioned as features in 
parallel with the primary offering, though it has little to 
do with the function of the primary offering. An example of 
a parallel attribute is the frequent flier miles programs 
for airlines. 
D. KEYS TO UTILIZING THE ATTRIBUTE MAP TO REDESIGN AN 
OFFERING 
By mapping the attributes of an offering for a 
particular customer segment, a company can create an 
attribute matrix that allows it to better identify, 
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evaluate, prioritize and pursue innovative opportunities 
for redesign and value creation. McGrath and MacMillan 
reveal several elements to this process that optimizes 
results: 1) mapping the attributes; 2) checking 
assumptions; 3) prioritizing actions; 4) capturing 
opportunities; and 5) keeping an eye on dynamics (2000, pp. 
35-47). The third element, prioritizing actions, is the 
focus of this study. 
Managers should give top priority to addressing 
negative attributes, with the very first priority being to 
resolve customer concerns by addressing attributes that are 
enragers or brewing enragers (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000, 
p. 42). In the corporate world, enragers should be 
eliminated at all costs. Eliminating enragers serves more 
to eliminate reasons for customers to dislike a product 
than it does to entice customers to like the product.  
The next priority is to deal with dissatisfiers and 
emerging dissatisfiers, which take away from the customer’s 
perception of value in a product (p. 42-43). Immediate and 
visible short-term improvements in these areas go a long 
way toward sparing a company from the increasing momentum 
of customer backlash that result from allowing these 
negative attributes to linger unaddressed.  
Though the most significant impact, and the primary 
focus of this study, centers around efforts to address 
negative attributes, dealing with positive or neutral 
attributes has its place in creating customer value. After 
addressing the most dominant negative attributes, the next 
priority is to address resource efficiency by dealing with 
nonnegotiables and “so-what” attributes (pp. 43-44). Since 
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nonnegotiables are not very profitable, they present an 
opportunity for managers to discover innovative ways to 
reduce the costs of including these attributes. The 
presence of “so-what” attributes is an indication that a 
company may be wasting valuable resources; hence, if it 
determines that an attribute is universally “so-what” for 
all of its customer segments, it should consider 
eliminating that attribute all together. If a company 
determines that an attribute is “so-what” for only some of 
its customers, then it must determine whether it would be 
more resource efficient to include the attribute for all 
customers or to reserve the attribute as an option for 
specific customers. If the attribute is inexpensive to 
produce, not a negative attribute for some customers, and 
considered by some customers as merely a nice-to-have only 
if it is free, then a company should consider including it 
for all customers. An example of this is demonstrated by 
the many features in Microsoft Office products that go 
unnoticed and unused by most users. On the other hand, if 
an attribute is the opposite of any of the previous 
description, then it should be considered as an option that 
willing customer segments can pay for separately. 
As a last priority, after categorizing the attributes 
of an offering and identifying the attributes that should 
be given top priority, managers can look for other latent 
opportunities. These opportunities may come through 
eliminating tolerables, improving upon discriminators and 
exciters, or establishing positive parallel 




allows managers to focus their innovation efforts on the 
facets of their offering that will net the most significant 
payoffs. 
E. TRANSLATING ATTRIBUTE MAPPING FROM THE BUSINESS WORLD 
TO THE WORLD OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
1. Adjusting Terminology and Context 
This study demonstrates that attribute mapping can be 
used not only to redesign offerings that are tangible 
products, but can be used to redesign anything that can be 
offered and marketed to a customer, including goods, 
services, experiences, events, persons, places, properties, 
organizations, information and ideas (Kotler and Keller, 
2006). The same process that managers use in profit 
generating companies to refocus their product attributes, 
can be adapted to attack the issue of declining foreign 
public opinion of America. Making this transition first 
requires a correlation between the terms used in the 
business world from Chapter III, and the terms used in the 
realm of public perceptions and diplomacy. 
Terms from the business world that warrant 
translations for the purposes of this study include: 
manager, customer, offering, attributes, and perceived 
value. The manager in this study is the U.S. government or 
any government employee in a position to shape foreign 
opinion. The customer is the foreign public, and the 
offerings are American policies, actions and identity. Just 
as a manager’s goal is sell a company’s products to the 
customers, a goal of the United States government could be 
to sell certain U.S. policies, actions and identity to the 
foreign public. In line with the attribute mapping 
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methodology, managers can best sell their offerings by 
prioritizing its attributes based on how the customers 
value the attributes. Similarly, the American government 
can best sell its policies, actions and identity by 
prioritizing American attributes based on how the foreign 
public values them. Accordingly, this study correlates 
attributes to the factors that cause resentment toward 
America, sometimes referred to in the remainder of this 
document as resentment factors. 
In the business world, managers determine whether 
attributes are perceived as positive, negative or neutral, 
and more importantly, determine where the attributes stand 
on the customer’s internal scale of importance. This 
valuation process reveals the final and most significant 
correlation that this study makes in order to apply 
attribute mapping to this foreign opinion context. A 
correlation was made between how managers determine their 
customer’s perceived value for product attributes, and how 
the United States could determine the foreign public’s 
perceived value for American attributes. To assign value to 
American attributes, the first task was to rank order the 
resentment factors that were most prominently identified by 
each of the two foreign public segments that were used in 
the study. The second task was to list the values that 
appeared to be most important to those segments. Finally, 
this information was combined with collective themes from 
all polling data, in a subjective evaluation, to determine 
how attributes might be valued. The final result was the 
development of theoretical attribute maps for each foreign 
public segment. 
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2. Research Scope and Limitations 
Applying the attribute mapping framework to this 
context required that the scope be narrowed down to a 
reasonable level for a study of this nature, yet still 
effectively demonstrate the methodology. The following 
sections explain the adjustments that were made and 
approaches that were used to accomplish this. 
a.  Adjusting Methodology for Scope 
As discussed in this chapter, for the attribute 
mapping methodology to be most effective, the users should 
narrow the evaluation process by conducting separate 
evaluations for different offerings, and separate 
evaluations for each customer segment. The cellular phone 
industry provides a simple example. In the cellular 
industry, in deciding how to redesign phones, service 
plans, and customer service attributes for business 
travelers, teenagers, and the elderly, a manager in a 
cellular company might develop nine separate attribute maps 
accounting for each possible combination of offerings and 
customers. Applying the methodology to public diplomacy is 
more complex; hence, for the purposes of demonstrating the 
attribute mapping process, this study uses an adjusted 
methodology that in a sense narrows and yet paradoxically 
broadens the scope of evaluation.  
The scope was narrowed in a sense, due to the 
fact that the foreign public polls used in the study 
collectively disclosed the attitudes of hundreds of 
thousands of respondents, from over 50 countries worldwide, 
and spanned a number of years; yet, the two attributes maps 
in Chapter IV focus solely on attitudes in Arab nations and 
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in Western Europe. Additionally, evaluation was further 
limited to the following countries that participated in all 
relevant polls: Arab nations – Morocco, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, and Lebanon; and Western European nations – 
Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden. 
In another sense, the scope was broadened in that 
it took the attribute mapping process from one that can be 
incredibly micro and focused, to one that gave a very macro 
view of the customers and offerings. For instance, though 
Arabs and Western Europeans can be further broken down into 
hundreds of geographic or demographic segments, with 
varying attitudes, for this study, they are generalized 
into only two major groups. And though one could also argue 
that American offerings and attributes can be broken down 
into hundreds of categories, for this study, they are 
lumped into only three categories of offerings, with 
closely related attributes joined to form less than twenty 
total attributes. In addition, though attribute maps should 
be adjusted over time to reflect attitudes during specific 
time periods, the attribute maps for this study were 
developed from a collection of attitudes that spanned 2004 
to 2007.  
Finally, this research is limited by the 
subjectivity involved in the attribute mapping process. 
Although the process requires that customer opinions be 
measured, and attempts to provide systematic and reliable 
procedures for analyzing those opinions, this research 
required a subjective interpretation of the data. In other 
words, this study relies not only on exact numbers that the 
polling data provides, but also relies on evaluation and 
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correlation of that data. Despite the research limitations, 
and the fact that more in-depth and segmented evaluation is 
required, the attribute maps in Chapter IV provide a good 
first step toward understanding how to prioritize the 
issues effecting foreign public opinion to support resource 
allocation decisions. 
b.  One Research Method, Two-pronged Approach 
Two slightly different approaches were used to 
demonstrate how attribute mapping might be adapted to 
determine how Arabs and Western Europeans value U.S. 
attributes, but the overall method applied was the same. 
Both approaches required the use of additional polling 
data, and both required combining research that identified 
public opinions about American attributes with research 
that identified public opinions on values. The first 
approach, used to evaluate Arab opinions, relied on key 
data that stemmed partly from Arabs’ answers to open-ended 
questions that specifically asked about opinions of America 
(Arab American Institute, 2004). The second approach, used 
to evaluate Western European opinions, used data that 
stemmed partly from close-ended general questions that were 
not on the topic of America (Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald 
and Eva, 2007). This two-pronged approach demonstrates the 
adaptability of the attribute mapping method, and the 
flexibility that its users may have in obtaining input for 
the mapping process on issues related to foreign opinion. 
Literature on this complex process of social 
research suggests that in the course of measuring public 
attitudes, both approaches have key advantages and 
disadvantages (Blalock, 1970, pp. 92-95). On the one hand, 
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questions geared toward a specific topic make the question 
more relevant to respondents and free them to reveal any 
definite ideas that they have on the topic; however, 
questions that are too specific could be of little general 
use in determining attitudes about a general topic if the 
respondent has a bias on the specific topic in question (p. 
93). For example, if an Arab man is asked a specific 
question about “American democracy,” he may give a 
different answer than he would if he were asked about the 
concept of democracy in general. Either way of asking the 
question can be effective, depending on the purpose of the 
study. Additionally, questions geared toward a specific 
topic, leave less room for interpretative error on the 
evaluator’s part; however, respondents are more likely to 
tell the evaluator what they think the evaluator wants to 
hear, or what is socially acceptable (p. 94). 
One possible advantage to the approach used to 
uncover Arab attitudes toward American attributes was that 
the open-ended questions did not limit Arab responses, 
which opened the door for responses that may not be 
prominent, but still need to be considered. A possible 
disadvantage was that in questioning Arabs about what was 
important to them, close-ended questions limited their 
possible responses. One advantage of the approach that was 
used to uncover Western European values was that the 
questions were worded in general terms, without reference 
to America, which minimized the likelihood of bias. 
However, a possible disadvantage was that there was more 
room for subjective interpretation error when evaluating 
the data. 
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For both approaches, the values that were 
identified were separated into higher-order values and 
‘basic’ values, the method used in the ESS (Jowell, 
Roberts, Fitzgerald and Eva, 2007, pp. 70-82). Higher-order 
values identify a person’s overarching “value orientation” 
(p. 170). Within higher-order values, are ‘basic’ values 
that identify a person’s guiding principles (p. 73). To 
prevent confusion between the term ‘basic’ referring to 
attributes, and ‘basic’ referring to values, ‘basic’ values 
will be referred to as lower-order values in the remainder 
of this document. 
3. Determining How Arabs Value U.S. Attributes 
In the process of creating a theoretical map of 
American attributes based on Arab opinions, 2004 through 
2006 polling data from the Arab American Institute (AAI) 
were most helpful. Zogby International, commissioned and 
supported by the AAI and the Young Arab Leaders group, 
conducted polls in the Arab world to not only gauge Arab 
opinions on America, but also to gain more insight into how 
influential certain resentment factors are on their overall 
opinions. For the purposes of this study, this data was 
used primarily to categorize attributes as positive, 
negative or neutral, to determine the level of consensus on 
those attributes, and to determine what attribute 
adjustments Arabs might ‘want’ America to make. The most 
useful insight gained from this poll stemmed from a series 
of four open-ended questions in the 2004 poll, which 
included: “What is [your] First Thought When You Hear 
America?;” what is the “Best Thing About America?;” what is 
the “Worst Thing About America?;” and “What Should America 
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do to Improve its Image in the Arab World?” (Arab American 
Institute, 2004, pp. 5-8). The answers to these questions, 
are summarized in Table 9. 
 
 
Table 9.   Summary of Arab Views on America (After: Arab 
American Institute, 2004, pp. 5-8) 




Table 10.   Summary of Most Prominent Arab Opinions on 
America (After: Arab American Institute, 2004) 
The results from Table 10 were evaluated in 
combination with results of 2005 and 2006 AAI polls. The 
results of the 2005 poll revealed how important concerns 
were in Arabs’ personal lives and how important concerns 
were that Arab nations were faced with (Arab American 
Institute, 2005, pp. 4-5). The personal concerns were 
correlated to higher-order values and the national concerns 
were correlated to lower-order values. A collective summary 
of the results are displayed in Table 11. 
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Table 11.   Summary of Most Important Arab Concerns (After: 
Arab American Institute, 2005) 
The 2006 poll revealed how divided the Arab public was 
about certain issues (Arab American Institute, 2006, p. 4). 
Following subjective evaluation of the combined data from 
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all polls, Table 12 was created to depict the correlations 
between Arabs’ higher-order personal values, lower-order 
national values, and resentment factors. 
 
 
Table 12.   Summary of How Arab Values Correlate with 
Resentment Factors 
The high value category identifies the top four lower-order 
national concerns and their associated factors, which 
relate mostly to Arabs’ top four higher-order personal 
concerns from Table 11. The mid-level value category 
identifies the next seven lower-order national concerns and 
associated factors that relate mostly to the next five 
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higher-order national concerns. The low value category 
identifies the remaining factors that do not have a strong 
correlation with any of the identified values. This 
information was later used to help categorize American 
attributes as energizers, differentiators or basic, and to 
create the attribute map that is discussed in Chapter IV. 
4. Determining How Western Europeans Value U.S. 
Attributes 
In order to map the American attributes from a Western 
European point of view, 2007 polling data from PRC and the 
European Social Survey (ESS) were collectively evaluated. 
One purpose of the 2007 PRC poll was to gauge foreign 
public opinions on the most current issues related to U.S. 
policy, action, and identity (Pew Research Center, 2007). 
Unlike the approach used to gain insight into Arab 
opinions, this poll used very specific close-ended 
questions; which requested that the respondents identify a 
point of view that was closest to their own point of view, 
usually on a scale of favorable-to-unfavorable, like-to-
dislike, or good-to-bad. Table 13 depicts a summary of the 
results. This data was used primarily to categorize 
attributes as positive, negative, or neutral based on the 
level of consensus and favorability on each issue. 
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Table 13.   Summary of Most Prominent Unfavorable U.S. 
Attributes for Western Europeans (After: Pew 
Research Center, 2007) 
The results from Table 13 were evaluated in 
combination with results from the ESS. The ESS was a 
rigorous, comparative social science research project, 
sponsored by the European Science Foundation, to uncover 
social differences between European countries and cultures 
(Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald, and Eva, 2007). Part of the 
project included a poll that identified basic types of 
values and the importance that the Europeans assigned to 
those values (pp. 169-202). The value categories included 
four higher-order values, and ten lower-order values (pp. 
173-175). This information was used primarily to categorize 
American attributes as energizers, differentiators, or 
basic for Western Europeans. A summary of how Western 
Europeans ranked these values are displayed in Table 14. 
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Table 14.   Summary of the Importance of Western European 
Values (After: Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald and 
Eva, 2007) 
In the final subjective evaluation of all of the data, any 
American attribute that best fit into the top two lower-
order values were categorized as energizers on the Western 
European attribute map in Chapter IV. Attributes that best 
fit into the next five lower-order values, were categorized 
as differentiators, with the remaining attributes being 
categorized as basic. 
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As discussed in this chapter, a key to effectively 
analyzing customer opinion data is to look for indications 
of what the customers, the Arab and Western European 
publics in this instance, most ‘value,’ as opposed to just 
what they ‘want.’ Business managers can accomplished this 
through specific solicitation of customer opinions, or by 
establishing a channel for gaining customer feedback about 
offering attributes.  Collectively analyzing several key 
data tables from opinion polls gave insight into how the 
attribute mapping process might help categorize resentment 
factors. In the next chapter, the results of this 
categorization are depicted in theoretical attribute maps 
for each customer segment. These results identify a 
potential way for America to prioritize its effort to 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Prior to prioritizing the resentment factors that 
America should address, it is necessary to categorize the 
factors on attribute maps. As revealed in Chapter III, 
priorities should consist of first addressing attributes 
that are enragers or brewing enragers, then addressing 
dissatisfiers and emerging dissatisfiers, followed by 
nonnegotiables and “so-what” attributes. Finally, after 
addressing these top three priorities, America can take 
advantage of any opportunities that present themselves 
through an evaluation of the remaining attributes. The 
following section outlines the results of the evaluation 
process outlined in Chapter III. These results present 
theoretical prioritization tables similar to those that 
have long provided valuable insights to businesses seeking 
to persuade customers of the value of their products and 
services. 
B. SUGGESTED ATTRIBUTE MAP: AN INTERPRETATION OF ARAB 
VALUATION OF RESENTMENT FACTORS 
Table 15 presents the theoretical prioritization table 
of American attributes from the Arabs’ point of view. It 
reveals several negative attributes that potentially have 
the greatest impact on negative Arab opinions, the 
attributes that most likely have the least impact, and the 
attributes that fall somewhere in the middle.  
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Table 15.   Attribute Map for Arabs Public 
1. Enragers: Iraq Occupation, Attack on Race & 
Undermining Islam  
Resentment factors reveal three themes that appear to 
be enragers for the Islamic public: America’s invasion of 
Iraq, perceived attack on the Arab race, and undermining of 
Islamic values. America’s identity and actions that most 
negatively and directly impact Arab’s most important values 
create the strongest feelings of resentment, disgust, fear 
and hatred toward America. The Arab public’s most important 
higher-order values were related to issues dealing with 
their family, quality of work, marriage and religion. The 
most important lower-order concerns were tied to health 
care, education, employment, and combating extremism and 
terrorism. Resentment factors and Arab ‘wants’ that fall 
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into this category are the invasion of Iraq, war against 
Arabs, killing Arabs, perceived disrespect toward Arabs, 
racism and Godlessness. 
This interpretation suggests that in Arabs’ minds, the 
war in Iraq may be associated with a war on the Arab people 
as a whole. Despite their difference, many Arabs feel a 
great sense of common identity, which includes their race 
and religion (Arab American Institute 2005, p. 1). They 
associate the war with the killing of Arabs. As such, they 
may perceive wars in their land, especially considering 
their view of the history of American war and intervention 
in the Middle East, as an attack on their race and 
religion. Additionally, the promotion of American culture, 
particularly its perceived perversities, to their nation 
may be viewed by many Arabs as another attack on their 
religion. Although there may be a segment of the Arab 
public that thinks of some aspects of American culture as a 
positive attributes, the value that it carries as a 
positive attribute for certain Arab segments is minute in 
comparison to its potential negative value.  
In summation, the resentment factors that most 
negatively energize Islamic nations stem from American 
actions when they lead to perceived imperialism or result 
in war in the Arab world. Other negative energizers stem 
from the American identity, when the perceived perversities 
in American culture compromise Islamic values. If there is 
anything that America can realistically and reasonably do 
to impact Islamic public opinion in these areas, it should 
be the top priority. It is unlikely that improvements in 
these areas will make Arabs think positively about America, 
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but the improvements may go a long way toward curbing the 
most extreme feelings of hatred and terrorist acts. 
2. Dissatisfiers: Repression, Unfair Middle East 
Policy, Imbalanced Support to Israel 
The major themes of the resentment factors that appear 
to be dissatisfiers are America’s perceived political and 
economic repression, and America’s unfair and imbalanced 
Middle East policy, particularly its support to Israel. The 
Arab public’s next tier of higher-order concerns, second 
only to energizers, concern issues that deal with friends, 
job security, local political issues, leisure time, and 
political issues facing the Arab nations in general. The 
lower-order concerns are tied to ending corruption and 
nepotism, advancing democracy, political government reform, 
lack of political debate on important issues, protecting 
personal and civil rights, resolving the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, and increasing rights for women. American 
policies that directly or indirectly have a negative impact 
in these value areas create feelings of resentment that may 
not be enraging, but are still very damaging to foreign 
relations. Since negative attributes are more divisive than 
positive attributes, the presence of these discriminators 
put a wedge between the United States and the Arab 
community, and makes it more likely that Arabs will either 
be apathetic to America’s positive attributes or that the 
positive attributes will go unnoticed.  
America’s perceived hypocrisy, its track record for 
putting self-interest above the socioeconomic prosperity of 
other nations, and its perceived backing of Israel 
regardless of circumstances, put America’s judgment and 
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motives in constant question. As a result, American efforts 
to promote democracy could fall on deaf ears, or be 
filtered through a web of doubt that weakens the message. 
Arabs might rationalize that – ‘promotion of democracy is 
America’s attempt to control us and keep us poor and 
repressed as they grow richer;’ or ‘America does not really 
care about us or else they would help fairly resolve the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.’ In addition, these 
resentment factors could be emerging enragers. The longer 
America allows the negative attributes to linger without at 
least demonstrating what is perceived as a sincere attempt 
to address them, the higher the risk is that they will turn 
into enragers. 
In summation, the resentment factors that Arab nations 
use to negatively differentiate America stem from U.S. 
policies that are perceived to be unfairly against Arabs 
and in Israel’s favor, as well as from American actions 
when they are perceived as a source of repression that 
keeps Arabs from prosperity. Second only to eliminating 
enragers, addressing these resentment factors should be 
America’s priority. Efforts to accomplish this would not 
only curb resentment, but could begin to sway Arab opinions 
in America’s favor as they find less to resent about 
America, and become more receptive to America’s positive 
attributes. Since one of America’s objectives is to promote 
democracy around the world, the message would be better 
received if these dissatisfiers were mitigated. 
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3. Nonnegotiables and So-Whats: American People, 
Products, Innovation, and Power 
The Zogby international polls not only shed light on 
the negative energizers and differentiators, but also 
revealed positive and neutral basic attributes, 
nonnegotiables and so-whats. These attributes are the third 
priority in accordance with the attribute mapping 
methodology. The polls indicate that the nonnegotiables 
center around American people, products and luxury, and 
science and technology, while a so-what attribute is 
American power. These attributes did not appear to have a 
direct and significant correlation with items on the list 
of Arab concerns; hence, the attributes were categorized as 
basic, which suggests that manipulating these attributes 
will not have a great impact on Arab opinions. As discussed 
in Chapter III, the significance of these attributes lies 
in their potential for being manipulated in order to create 
efficiencies in efforts to create customer value. 
Since the payoff from nonnegotiables and so-whats are 
low, America should discover innovative ways to reduce the 
amount of resources devoted to promoting or introducing the 
Arab public to American people, products, innovation and 
power in an effort to sway their opinions. Although Arabs 
identified these as mostly positive American attributes, 
they expect it and do not consider them special enough to 
sway their opinions. For example, America’s effort to 
increase internship opportunities for Arab women, though a 
worthwhile effort, should not take precedence over 
America’s efforts to end the war in Iraq (Bureau of Near 
Eastern Affairs, 2003). This does not suggest that programs 
that introduce Arabs to basic positive American attributes 
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have no value; on the contrary, if these programs were 
eliminated, it could result in a more prominent negative 
view of America in the Arab world. The point is that the 
value that Arabs assign to America’s negative attributes 
greatly outweigh the value they assign to these positive 
attributes. 
In summation, factors that stem from American 
identity, manifested through American people, American 
things, and American power, are viewed by some as negative 
attributes (Occidentalism, 2005), but according to the 
polls, they are also viewed as positive basic attributes by 
many Arabs. America’s third priority in its effort to 
counter negative public opinion in the Arab world should be 
to introduce the Arab public to these aspects of the 
American identity, while minimizing the use of resources to 
do it. These improvements in resource efficiency may not 
directly avert terrorism or increase receptiveness to 
democracy, but it may prevent public opinion from growing 
more negative than it already is, and it might allow 
America to divert valuable resources toward the efforts 
that make the biggest impact. 
4. Additional Considerations 
In addition to the three suggested priorities, several 
other considerations become evident through analyzing the 
attribute map. American oil interests, perceived 
imperialism, and materialism appear to be tolerables, while 
parallel differentiators might be found through American 
commitment to Arab issues. Though the tolerable attributes 
are negative, there is no indication that they are valued 
to a degree that would make them worth addressing. However, 
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today’s tolerables can be tomorrow’s dissatisfiers, so 
opinions in this area should be closely watched. Certain 
factors were noted as parallel differentiators because 
through subjective evaluation, they could not be 
effectively categorized elsewhere. These factors seemed to 
have more than a basic value, but not quite an energizing 
value. They were neither positive nor negative current 
attributes, but had implied potential to be positive or 
negative depending on the direction America took them. The 
collective theme of these factors shows that the Arab 
public wants America to demonstrate a commitment to peace, 
justice, solving Palestinians issues, international law and 
Arab relations. Addressing these concerns in the right way 
has potential for great payoff. 
Positive features included American entertainment, 
personal freedom, international democracy, and more 
importantly, employment opportunities.  One of Arab’s most 
important higher-order values concern issues dealing with 
quality of work, with job security also being highly 
valued. This makes employment opportunities the only 
exciter on the attribute map, making it the positive 
attribute, which if delivered to Arabs, has the greatest 
potential to help offset the negative attributes. Other 
positive attributes like American entertainment, personal 
freedom, and international democracy also can help offset 
negative opinion; however, further study and careful 
segmentation is required in this area, as it appears that 
these attributes are neutrally or negatively viewed by some 
Arabs. Lastly, potential exciters exist in areas of 
education and healthcare for in the Arab world. Education  
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and healthcare are top concerns, and if America can show 
that it helps address these concerns, America will be 
viewed more favorably. 
C. SUGGESTED ATTRIBUTE MAP: AN INTERPRETATION OF WESTERN 
EUROPEAN VALUATION OF RESENTMENT FACTORS 
Table 16 presents the theoretical prioritization of 
American attributes from Western Europe’s point of view. It 
suggests that there is one primary negative attribute that 
overshadows the impact of other attributes on anti-American 
Western European sentiment. 
 
Table 16.   Attribute Map for Western European Public 
1. Enragers: Unilateralism 
The primary resentment factor that appears to be an 
enrager for the Western European public is America’s 
unilateralism. The public’s most important higher-order 
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value is self-transcendence; corresponding with lower-order 
values of benevolence and universalism. This suggests that 
U.S. policies that result in a stand-off between America 
and a near consensus in Western Europe have the greatest 
negative impact on public opinion, as it conflicts with 
what they value most. Resentment factors like the U.S. 
stance on issues dealing with biological weapons, land 
mines, environmental pollution, and other global concerns 
are the potential causes of the Westerns European’s recent 
calls for greater independence from America. Although other 
factors, like economic interdependence (Ahearn, 2007, p. 
16), come into play when considering foreign relations, 
America should give a hard look at the issue of 
unilateralism. 
In Mark Lubell’s study on “understanding the 
development of attitudinal support for democratic governing 
institutions,” published as part of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency-sponsored Community Based Environmental 
Decision Making Proceedings on “Cooperation in 
Environmental Decision Making,” he discussed the importance 
of perceived procedural fairness in national policy. 
Fairness evaluations have the largest effect on 
attitudinal support. Perceptions of procedural 
fairness increase effectiveness by 24% points and 
cooperation by 44% points. Keeping in mind how 
the measure of procedural fairness is related to 
self-interest, stakeholders obviously place a 
high value on the adequacy of their 
representation in the decision-making process. 
This is because gaining access to the benefits of 
collective action requires representation in the 
decision-making process. Similarly, stakeholders 
who believe business dominates estuary decision-
making have a lower level of attitudinal support, 
although the effect of business domination is 
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much smaller (6.6% point decrease for 
effectiveness and 5.1% point decrease for 
cooperation) than overall procedural fairness. 
(Lubell, pp. 37-38). 
Lubell’s findings, and the fact that universalism has the 
highest value, support the idea that unilateralism could be 
an enrager to Western Europeans. If the United States 
intends to demonstrate its commitment to improving 
international relations, its top priority should be to 
revisit its use of unilateralist policies whenever 
possible, particularly on issues that concern the rest of 
the world. Some short-term economic or freedom-of-action 
sacrifices, for the sake of considering foreign opinion, 
could pay long-term dividends in the realm of global 
collaboration. 
2. Dissatisfiers: Spreading American Culture, 
Favoritism for Israel; Environmental Issues, and 
Troops in Iraq 
The resentment factors that appear to be dissatisfiers 
deal with issues of spreading American culture, perceived 
imbalanced support for Israel, environmental pollution, and 
troops in Iraq. Factors in this category were either in 
conflict with a mid-level value, or opinions significantly 
varied as to whether or not they were in conflict with a 
high value. This suggests that America could potentially 
sway public opinion in its favor by limiting American 
sponsored activities that are perceived as being in 
conflict with local tradition, or by sponsoring activities 
that demonstrate American respect for their tradition. 
Interestingly, issues dealing with support to Israel, the 
environment, and troops in Iraq also relate to what many 
perceive as American unilateralism. This indicates the 
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considerable potential for these dissatisfiers to become 
enragers for certain public segments. Similar to American 
attributes that are dissatisfying for the Arab world, the 
longer America allows the negative attributes to linger 
unaddressed with its allies, the higher the risk is that 
they will become enragers. 
3. Nonnegotiables and So-Whats: Science and 
Technology 
The attribute map reveals that the third priority, a 
nonnegotiable, is American science and technology. No so-
what attributes were identified. Science and technology, or 
American innovation, was a positive attribute, but did not 
show a significant value to Western Europeans. They simply 
expect this attribute from America. This suggests that 
there is little to no payoff to be gained by promoting 
American innovation to Western Europeans, as they can 
innovate on their own; however, if America demonstrates a 
lack of innovation, it would surely be frowned upon.  
American efforts to introduce innovations to Western 
Europe, with the goal being to improve public opinion, will 
be in vain and a waste of resources, unless accompanied by 
other objectives. Note that any innovation that is 
perceived to be in conflict with a Western European 
tradition can move from being a nonnegotiable to a 
dissatisfier. 
4. Additional Considerations 
America’s selective promotion of American-style 
democracy and American business practices that are 
perceived to increase the rich-poor gap appear to be 
tolerables. Although they are not in direct conflict with 
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values rated high in importance, America should take note 
of these concerns and watch for indications of them 
becoming dissatisfiers. A wide variation in opinions 
concerning the American people, American-led GWOT, and 
troops in Afghanistan, led to these attributes being 
categorized as parallel differentiators. These attributes 
seemed to have more than a basic value, but not an 
energizing value; and they had the potential to be positive 
or negative.  The sole positive attribute of significant 
value, identified as a discriminator that may help to 
offset negative opinion, was American entertainment. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The first phase of this study identified and 
consolidated a list of factors that contribute to anti-
American sentiments. The factors vary in legitimacy, 
disputability, and prominence. Chapter II identified the 
most prominent of these factors, as revealed through a 
variety of sources, from scholarly works, to internet 
forums that were open for contributions from the general 
public. Many of the sources, like the polls used, included 
direct input from the foreign public. The United States has 
recognized this anti-Americanism phenomenon as a growing 
concern, and it may be able make a significant impact on 
this issue by addressing the resentment factors. Given the 
reality of fiscal and resource constraints, adequately 
addressing this issue requires prioritizing the relative 
importance of the factors that contribute to it. 
The second phase of this study suggested a 
prioritization mechanism that could be used to analyze 
resentment factors. The suggested framework used a flexible 
approach to attribute mapping. To demonstrate the method, 
attribute maps were developed for two foreign public 
segments, consisting of four Arab nations and five Western 
European nations. Although the maps are only based on 
notional approaches, the illustrative model does serve as a 
starting point for identifying the most important 




Chapter II. In order to provide operationally valid output, 
further research and subject-matter expertise is required 
to refine the model’s input data. 
Based on the notional attribute maps developed in this 
study, several priorities emerged. America’s top tier of 
priorities include the following: consider options to 
minimize the visible presence of U.S. troops in Arab 
nations; address U.S. direct involvement in armed conflict 
on Arab soil; increase understanding and consideration of 
how U.S.-sponsored activities and influence within Arab 
nations are perceived to impact Arab-Islamic culture; and 
reevaluate the correlation between procedural fairness and 
unilateralist policy decisions, and the increasing wedge 
between America and its European allies. The second tier of 
priorities should include the following: revaluating Middle 
East policy -- particularly possible compromise and parity 
with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and 
increasing U.S. understanding and consideration of how 
U.S.-sponsored activities and influence Western European 
nations are perceived to impact their tradition. 
Conversely, the notional model suggests the relative 
ineffectiveness of improving Arabs’ opinions about America 
by introducing them to American people and things, and the 
ineffectiveness of improving Europeans opinions by 
introducing them to American science and technology. 
America’s third priority should be to divert excessive 
resource allocations from programs in these areas, toward 
efforts within the top two tiers of priorities. After the 
top three priorities have been considered, America should 
look for innovative opportunities to improve foreign public 
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opinions on the remaining areas of interest: oil dependence 
and imperial aspirations; Arab domestic issues, like 
employment, education and healthcare; selective promotion 
of American-style democracy; American business practices 
that are perceived to increase the rich-poor gap; American-
led GWOT and troops in Afghanistan; and American 
entertainment in Western Europe. 
B. RECOMMENDED READING 
During this study, an attempt was made to identify 
recommended sources for readers who are interested in 
further research. A study of this nature should begin by 
first reviewing what the United States National Security 
Strategy (NSS) has to say about handling international 
opinion. The U.S. stance on this issue is revealed in the 
most recent NSS, published in March of 2006. Based on a 
review of the literature, the following works were 
identified as the most relevant sources, and as a starting 
point, for future researchers who pursue similar topics. 
In conducting this study, it became apparent that 
anti-Americanism in the last decade was the catalyst for a 
great deal of research on the topic of why foreigners 
resent America. In 2003, Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Davies, 
information scientist and anthropologist respectively, and 
well-known England-based authors, presented some of the 
prevailing themes of anti-Americanism in their book, Why Do 
People Hate America? This book raises key questions about 
American actions, the nature of power and responsibility, 
and argues that American activities magnify world poverty 
and damage the environment. U.S. policy issues also are 
widely covered by American and foreign media. U.K.-based 
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media outlets, BBC News and The Guardian, were valuable 
sources for the foreign perspective on decisions that 
America has made. As this study discusses in Chapter II, 
Buruma and Margalit, in their 2004 book, Occidentalism, 
present criticisms that relate to the Eastern world’s 
perceptions of the perversity of the Western world. This 
controversial point of view should be studied when pursuing 
research in this area. Additionally, the three series of 
polls conducted by Zogby international, the Pew Research 
Center, and the European Science Foundation, proved 
critical and relevant to this line of research. The polling 
statistics in this study merely scratches the surface of 
the implications on anti-Americanism. There is a 
substantial void for more in-depth segmentation as well as 
broader consequential research on this topic, for which 
these polls could prove critical. 
Finally, several writings from Rita McGrath and Ian 
MacMillan present techniques, like attribute mapping, for 
discovering innovative opportunities. Of their combined 
works, their 2000 book, The Entrepreneurial Mindset, 
contains the most comprehensive list of techniques for 
creating value. As suggested by this study, value creation 
is a concept that can be applied over a broad spectrum of 
issues. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research effort suggested that the attribute 
mapping framework is a potentially powerful method for 
prioritizing the factors that contribute to anti-
Americanism. Further research is required in order to 
segment the foreign public into more distinct groups, with 
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similar values, to further distinguish American offerings 
and attributes, to determine what can and cannot reasonably 
be addressed, and to optimize the research approach in 
order to create an operationally valid and useful decision-
making aid. 
Each of the cells in the suggested attribute map could 
be expanded for in-depth evaluation. This would require 
additional sub-attribute mapping, an expanded literature 
review of the topic, solicitation of direct input from 
subject-matter experts in each field, and a thorough 
analysis of the possibilities for change. Such an 
exhaustive study could reveal many intricacies on the topic 
that are outside of America’s direct control or sphere of 
influence. This study did not make that distinction. 
Finally, further research could incorporate a more 
refined temporal element. Attribute mapping is a process 
that is meant to be used repeatedly as the environment and 
circumstances shift over time. This study took a collective 
snapshot of a period of years between 2001 and 2007, though 
within that period, shifts have occurred. By refining the 
key elements in this area of research, the United States 
could find another valuable tool in the fight to improve 
international relations and in the battle for the hearts 
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